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Intimate Partner Criminal Harassment 
Through a Lens of Responsibilization
ISABEL GRANT *
Feminist scholars have demonstrated the gendered nature of intimate violence and the 
tendency to put the responsibility on women to avoid both sexual and physical violence 
(“responsibilization”). This article applies these insights to the context of intimate partner 
criminal harassment, which is committed overwhelmingly by men against former female 
intimate partners. Using criminal harassment decisions over the past decade, this article 
argues that the elements of the offence—specifically the requirements that the accused 
cause the complainant to fear for her safety, that this fear be reasonable, and that he intend 
to harass her—feed into the tendency towards responsibilization. Women are disbelieved if 
they fail to report the harassment promptly to police, fail to obtain a no contact order, or fail to 
communicate to their harassers that the harassment is unwanted. The accused’s behaviour 
is never subjected to a standard of reasonableness. The article concludes that legislative 
reform is a necessary step towards providing an adequate criminal justice response to this 
serious problem.
Les universitaires féministes ont démontré que la violence conjugale est fondée sur le sexe 
et qu’il existe une tendance à responsabiliser les femmes afin qu’elles évitent de subir 
des violences tant physiques que sexuelles. Cet article applique ces notions intuitives au 
contexte du harcèlement criminel par un partenaire intime, qui est commis dans la très 
grande majorité des cas par les hommes à l’égard de leur ancienne conjointe. Se fondant 
sur les jugements en matière de harcèlement criminel rendus depuis dix ans, l’article est 
d’avis que les éléments de la preuve–particulièrement la nécessité que l’accusé ait porté la 
plaignante à craindre pour sa sécurité, que cette crainte soit fondée et qu’il ait eu l’intention 
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de la harceler–étayent cette tendance à la responsabilisation. On croit moins les femmes si 
elles tardent à déclarer promptement à la police le fait qu’elles sont harcelées, négligent 
de réclamer une ordonnance d’interdiction de communiquer ou négligent de faire savoir à 
leur harceleur que le harcèlement est non désiré. Le comportement de l’accusé n’est jamais 
soumis à la norme du raisonnable. L’article conclut qu’une réforme législative s’impose afin 
que la justice criminelle soit en mesure de répondre adéquatement à ce grave problème.
ONE OF THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTIONS of feminist scholarship to criminal law 
has been to establish the gendered nature of intimate partner violence.1 Intimate 
partner violence and sexual assault, for example, are committed overwhelmingly 
by men against women. In this article, I explore how intimate partner criminal 
harassment is also a gendered crime and how judicial decisions reflect the same 
biases and assumptions that other gendered crimes reveal. Specifically, I will argue 
that, as with sexual assault, the law of criminal harassment has been influenced by 
assumptions about how women should respond to male violence and how they 
are responsible for changing their lives in order to avoid it.2 This tendency to put 
1. Lisa S Price, Feminist Frameworks: Building Theory on Violence against Women (Halifax: 
Fernwood, 2005) at 11.
2. I am indebted to Lise Gotell whose groundbreaking work demonstrates how discourses of 
responsibilization and risk management are prevalent in Canadian sexual assault decisions. 
See e.g. Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: 
Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women” (2008) 41:4 Akron L Rev 865 [Gotell, 
“Rethinking Affirmative Consent”]; Lise Gotell, “The Discursive Disappearance of Sexualized 
Violence: Feminist Law Reform, Judicial Resistance, and Neo-Liberal Sexual Citizenship” in 
Dorothy E Chunn, Susan B Boyd & Hester Lessard, eds, Reaction and Resistance: Feminism, 
Law and Social Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 127 [Gotell, “The Discursive 
Disappearance”].
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responsibility on women to avoid gendered violence, referred to in this article as 
“responsibilization,” has hindered effective law enforcement of these crimes. In the 
context of criminal harassment, this tendency is facilitated both by the legislative 
requirements of criminal harassment and by the judicial interpretation thereof.
The Supreme Court of Canada has had many opportunities to deal with 
gendered crimes in recent years and has fallen short.3 Emma Cunliffe has 
demonstrated, for example, that equality is rarely given serious consideration 
in recent sexual assault decisions of the Court.4 With respect to sexual assault 
prosecutions more generally, women are often criticized for their inadequate 
expressions of non-consent or for other behaviours that may have “encouraged” 
the violence against them.5 This article demonstrates that the same phenomenon 
is seen in criminal harassment cases. By definition, this crime requires the Crown 
to prove that the complainant, who is almost always a woman in intimate partner 
harassment, was afraid for her safety or that of others and that her fear was 
3. See R v JA, 2011 SCC 28, [2011] 2 SCR 440 [JA]. In JA, while the outcome is consistent 
with gender equality, the analysis takes a gender-neutral approach to sexual assault and 
fails to examine the context of intimate partner violence that was so central to the case. 
For further analysis on JA, see Janine Benedet, “Marital Rape, Polygamy, and Prostitution: 
Trading Sex Equality for Agency and Choice?” (2013) 18:2 Rev Const Stud 161 [Benedet, 
“Marital Rape”]. See also R v Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, [2015] 1 SCR 346. In Hutchinson, 
the majority failed to consider the implications of its approach to statutory interpretation 
for complainants with mental disabilities or other forms of incapacity to consent such as 
intoxication (see Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 273.1(2)(b)-(c)). The majority’s 
approach also fails to see sexual assault as a gendered phenomenon. For a discussion of 
how sexual assault has become degendered and detached from equality, see Gotell, “The 
Discursive Disappearance,” supra note 2. See also R v DAI, 2012 SCC 5, [2012] 1 SCR 
149 (involving the sexual assault of a woman with a mental disability); R v O’Brien, 2013 
SCC 2, [2013] 1 SCR 7 (involving uttering threats in the context of an intimate partner 
relationship); R v Ryan, 2013 SCC 3, [2013] 1 SCR 14 (involving the defence of duress 
for a woman who had been repeatedly harassed by her ex-partner). In all of these decisions, 
the gendered nature of intimate partner violence and sexual assault is missing from the 
Court’s analysis.
4. Emma Cunliffe, “Sexual Assault Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada: Losing Sight 
of Substantive Equality” (2012) 57 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 295. Cunliffe argues that while 
equality has underpinned the development of the substantive definition of consent as well 
as legislative reforms to improve trial procedure, individual complainants are still not fully 
protected from myths and stereotypes in situations where consent and credibility are in issue. 
This is not due to the absence of legal tools to address these problems but instead a result of 
the failure of judicial approaches to infuse equality reasoning in trial and appellate decisions.
5. In her article on the ethical responsibilities of defence counsel in sexual assault prosecutions, 
Elaine Craig demonstrates that defence counsel still make use of stereotypes about women’s 
sexuality in defending sexual assault prosecutions. See Elaine Craig, “The Ethical Obligations 
of Defence Counsel in Sexual Assault Cases” (2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 427.
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reasonable in the circumstances. The response of the complainant is scrutinized 
and may be found wanting, thus preventing a successful prosecution. The 
woman’s life may be significantly disrupted by the harassment, she may have to 
change much of her day-to-day routine, and she may be unable to work because 
of the harassment. But if she was not afraid for her safety in a way that is judged 
by others to be reasonable, the law does not recognize the harassment. At no time, 
however, is her harasser held to a standard of objectively reasonable behaviour.
Section 264 of the Criminal Code sets out the definition of criminal 
harassment in Canada:
1. No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another 
person is harassed or recklessly as to whether the other person is 
harassed, engage in conduct referred to in subsection (2) that causes 
that other person reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear for 
their safety or the safety of anyone known to them.
2. The conduct mentioned in subsection (1) consists of
a. repeatedly following from place to place the other person or 
anyone known to them;
b. repeatedly communicating with, either directly or indirectly, 
the other person or anyone known to them;
c. besetting or watching the dwelling-house, or place where the 
other person, or anyone known to them, resides, works, carries 
on business or happens to be; or
d. engaging in threatening conduct directed at the other person 
or any member of their family.6
The offence is a hybrid offence punishable by a maximum 10 years on 
indictment and 6 months on summary conviction.7 Parliament enacted this 
section in 1993 in response to a number of murders of women by former intimate 
partners after a period of criminal harassment.8 Section 231(6) was also added to 
the Criminal Code in 1997. It classifies murders that take place in the course of 
criminal harassment as first-degree murder.9
This article begins with a brief description of what we know about intimate 
partner criminal harassment in terms of its incidence, its impact on the women 
harassed, and the criminal justice response to this crime. Part II summarizes the 
6. Supra note 3, ss 264(1)-(2).
7. Ibid, ss 264(3), 787(1).
8. See Isabel Grant, Natasha Bone & Kathy Grant, “Canada’s Criminal Harassment Provisions: 
A Review of the First Ten Years” (2003) 29:1 Queen’s LJ 175.
9. Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 231(6).
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theoretical literature on the concept of “responsibilization” as informed by the 
work of feminists in the areas of sexual assault and intimate partner violence. 
After setting out this context, the article turns to an analysis of the case law 
on intimate partner harassment, focusing on three elements of the offence: 
the requirement that the complainant be afraid for her safety or the safety of 
others, the requirement that the fear be reasonable, and the requirement that the 
accused know that his conduct is harassing. The focus of this article is the judicial 
discourse around the elements of criminal harassment and how this discourse 
perpetuates problematic assumptions about gendered violence and women’s 
responsibility to avoid it.
I. THE EMPIRICAL REALITY OF CRIMINAL HARASSMENT
While a number of academic articles were written after section 264 was enacted,10 
criminal harassment is under-studied and under-theorized in more recent legal 
and feminist literature in Canada. However, a significant social science and 
medical literature exploring criminal harassment reveals how dangerous and 
destructive former intimate partner harassment can be for women.11
10. Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Criminalization of Stalking: An Exercise in Media Manipulation 
and Political Opportunism” (1994) 39 McGill LJ 379; Grant, Bone & Grant, supra note 8; 
Bruce MacFarlane, “People Who Stalk People” (1997) 31:1 UBC L Rev 37; Diane Crocker, 
“Criminalizing Harassment and the Transformative Potential of Law” (2008) 20:1 CJWL 87.
11. See e.g. Kimberly N Fleming et al, “Intimate Partner Stalking Victimization and 
Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms in Post-Abuse Women” (2012) 18:12 Violence Against 
Women 1368; Maria A Pico-Alfonso et al, “The Impact of Physical, Psychological, and 
Sexual Intimate Male Partner Violence on Women’s Mental Health: Depressive Symptoms, 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, State Anxiety, and Suicide” (2006) 15:5 J of Women’s Health 
599; Nadine Wathen, “Health Impacts of Violent Victimization on Women and their 
Children” (2012) at 10-11, online: Department of Justice Canada <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/rr12_12/index.html>; World Health Organization, Global and regional 
estimates of violence against women: prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence 
and non-partner sexual violence (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2013) at 
21-26, online: <www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/violence/9789241564625/
en>; Laura E Watkins et al, “The Longitudinal Impact of Intimate Partner Aggression and 
Relationship Status on Women’s Physical Health and Depression Symptoms” (2014) 28:5 
J Family Psych 655; Emily Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime or a Crime of Violence?” 
(2002) 41:5 Howard J Crim Just 422 [Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime”]; Frank R 
Farnham, David V James & Paul Cantrell, “Association between violence, psychosis, and 
relationship to victim and stalkers” (2000) 355 The Lancet 199; David V James & Frank 
R Farnham, “Stalking and Serious Violence” (2003) 31 J Am Psych Law 432; Michele 
Pathé, Rachel Mackenzie & Paul Mullen, “Stalking by law: damaging victims and rewarding 
offenders” (2004) 12 JL Med 103 at 106; Leila B Dutton & Barbara A Winstead, “Types, 
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The extent of criminal harassment and its threat to women’s equality should 
not be underestimated. Women experience criminal harassment in Canada at 
an alarming rate. In the most recent Statistics Canada survey, for example, 3% 
of all women reported being stalked in 2009.12 In 2011, uttering threats and 
criminal harassment accounted for 20% of violent crime against women in 
Canada.13 There were approximately 11,700 female victims of police-reported 
criminal harassment in 2011, which constituted more than 75% of all criminal 
harassment complaints to police.14 In that same year, 85% of perpetrators in 
incidents against women were men. Intimate partners accounted for 58% of all 
criminal harassment of women. Strangers accounted for only 8% of criminal 
harassment.15 In the past decade, 39 women have been murdered after being 
criminally harassed, including 3 women who were killed in 2011.16
Studies also suggest that a large number of women who have been criminally 
harassed by a former partner have also been assaulted or sexually assaulted by 
him.17 While criminal harassment does not necessarily involve further physical 
violence, intimate partner criminal harassment is more likely to escalate to assault 
or even femicide than other forms of criminal harassment.18 Intimate partner 
criminal harassment is also likely to last up to twice as long on average as other 
Frequency, and Effectiveness of Responses to Unwanted Pursuit and Stalking” (2011) 26:6 J 
Interpersonal Violence 1129.
12. Statistics Canada, Measuring violence against women: statistical trends, Sinha Maire, 
ed (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 25 February 2013) at 33 [Statistics Canada, 
Measuring violence].
13. Ibid at 8. According to this recent Statistics Canada report, “the five most common violent 
offences committed against women were common assault (49%), uttering threats (13%), 
serious assault (10%), sexual assault level I (7%), and criminal harassment (7%).”
14. Ibid at 32.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid at 33. In the United States, a study of intimate partner femicides in 10 cities found 
that 76% of victims had been “stalked” in the 12 months prior to the killing. See Judith 
M McFarlane et al, “Stalking in Intimate Partner Femicide” (1999) 3:4 Homicide 
Studies 300 at 308.
17. Carol E Jordan et al, “Stalking: an Examination of the Criminal Justice Response” (2003) 
18:2 J Interpersonal Violence 148 at 149.
18. Farnham, James & Cantrell, supra note 11 at 199. This study found that 70% of the sample 
of intimate partner harassments involved serious physical violence, whereas only 27% of 
the stranger/acquaintance sample did. See also James & Farnham, “Stalking and Serious 
Violence,” supra note 11 at 433, 438.
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forms of criminal harassment.19 Intimate partner criminal harassers are less likely 
to have a serious mental illness than those who harass strangers.20 When it comes 
to criminal harassment, women are at greatest risk of escalating violence from 
non-mentally ill, former intimate partners.21
Intimate partner criminal harassment is often only one component of a 
constellation of behaviours, such as assault and threatening, all of which together 
form part of the male partner’s assertion of control over his (former) partner.22 
Evan Stark describes “stalking” as the most common behavioural component of 
coercive control next to assault.23 As such, intimate partner criminal harassment 
can be seen as a variant of intimate partner violence, which reflects the ongoing 
inequality of women in intimate relationships.24 As Rosemary Cairns Way 
has pointed out:
Stalking is one vicious manifestation of a broader spectrum of violence against 
women–one part of a multi-faceted whole, integrally linked to the systemic 
social, economic and political inequalities experienced daily by Canadian women. 
The statistics detailing the extent of violence against women in Canada provide 
horrifying evidence of the “brutal face of inequality.”25
Criminal harassment is an extremely traumatic experience that often 
continues for a significant period of time. Women respond in different ways to 
this kind of ongoing stress in their lives. For some women, the harm resulting 
from harassment “is severe and long-lasting; indeed the adverse consequences 
caused by victimization frequently outlive the duration of the harassment.”26 
Finch cites English studies that suggest that from 71–94% of those subjected to 
19. Evan Stark, Coercive Control: The Entrapment of Women in Personal Life (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) at 256 [Stark, Coercive Control]. See also Terry Goldsworthy & 
Matthew Raj, “Stopping the stalker: Victim responses to stalking” (2014) 2:1 Griffith J Law 
& Human Dignity 171 at 190.
20. Farnham, James & Cantrell, supra note 11 at 199.
21. Ibid.
22. Joanna Birenbaum & Isabel Grant, “Taking Threats Seriously: Section 264.1 and Threats as a 
form of Domestic Violence” (2012) 59 Crim LQ 206 at 214.
23. Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 19 at 256.
24. See e.g. Jordan et al, supra note 17 at 149. The authors state that “stalking is but one variant 
of intimate violence.” Feminist scholars have debated the meaning and definition of violence 
and whether it requires actual force before behaviour can be labelled violent. See Price, supra 
note 1 at 11-23. For an argument that uttering threats is a form of intimate partner violence, 
see also Birenbaum & Grant, supra note 22. Statistics Canada describes criminal harassment 
as a violent crime. See Statistics Canada, Measuring violence, supra note 12 at 4.
25. Supra note 10 at 381.
26. Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime,” supra note 11 at 424.
(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL559
harassment undergo major lifestyle and personality changes.27 Sleep and appetite 
disturbances are common.28 Complainants are likely to become paranoid, 
anxious, introverted, and less trustful generally, not just with respect to the 
harasser. Complainants also commonly experience social isolation and a sense of 
powerlessness. There is a high risk of depressive symptoms, including self-harm.29 
The General Social Survey found that female complainants were more likely than 
their male counterparts to stop going out alone and to socialize less after experi-
encing criminal harassment.30
Criminal justice responses to intimate partner harassment have been 
found wanting in a number of jurisdictions. In Canada, the majority of police 
complaints do not result in formal charges. Many charges are dropped without 
proceeding, or dropped in exchange for the accused entering into a no contact 
order. An early review of charges under section 264, for example, found that 
58% of charges were stayed or withdrawn before trial and, of those charges that 
proceeded, only about 35% were convicted.31 The large American National 
Violence against Women Survey in 2000 found that for every 100 female stalking 
victims identified, “52 reported the crimes to the police, 13 men were prosecuted, 
7 were convicted, and 4 went to jail.”32 It is no surprise that victims of criminal 
harassment lack confidence in the criminal justice system, which leads to even 
lower rates of reporting.33 As with sexual assault, the complainant’s credibility 
27. Ibid.
28. Dutton & Winstead, supra note 11 at 1131.
29. Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime,” supra note 11 at 425.
30. Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile 2005, Kathy Aucoin, ed 
(Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2005) at 40 [Statistics Canada, Family Violence].
31. Richard Gill & Joan Brockman, Department of Justice Canada, A Review of Section 264 
(Criminal Harassment) of the Criminal Code of Canada (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 
October 1996) at vii, online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/wd96_7-dt96_7/
wd96_7.pdf>. A more recent study conducted in the United States found that 54% of 
amended felony charges of criminal harassment and 62% of amended misdemeanour charges 
were dismissed. See Jordan et al, supra note 17 at 159.
32. Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 19 at 256.
33. See Justice Unions’ Parliamentary Group, Independent Parliamentary Inquiry into Stalking 
Law Reform: Main Findings and Recommendations (February 2012) at 8-9, 11 (Chair: Rt 
Hon Elfyn Llwyd MP), online: DASH (2009) <www.dashriskchecklist.co.uk/uploads/
Stalking%20Law%20Reform%20Findings%20Report%202012.pdf>. The inquiry cites 
a study presented to it in which 72% of complainants reported being unhappy with the 
criminal justice response to the harassment, while 65% reported being unhappy with the 
police response. Complainants reported that their complaints to police were not investigated 
thoroughly even though reports were usually not made to police until after a significant 
number of incidents.
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may be doubted because she has had ongoing contact with the accused or because 
she is distraught when she reports the harassment to police.34 In some cases, the 
complainant actually returns to her former partner as a means of ending the 
harassment, further undermining her credibility with the police.35 Police may see 
the matter as ‘merely’ a domestic dispute that should be resolved privately, partic-
ularly where the isolated acts of the harasser are not in themselves threatening or 
physically violent.
No contact orders36 are often resorted to in criminal harassment cases, but 
they often fail to stop the harassment and can be counterproductive in some 
cases.37 As Michele Pathé, Rachel Mackenzie, and Paul Mullen write:
Protection orders provide dubious benefits for the victim but for stalkers unassailable 
opportunities to further their harassment. As noted earlier, stalkers may petition 
the court for a protection order against the victim, alleging that person is, in fact, 
stalking them. [Intimate partner] stalkers are more disposed than other groups 
to duplicitous behaviour of this type. Protection order hearings enforce contact 
between stalker and victim, imposing a relationship that is both gratifying to the 
stalker and distressing to the victim. They indulge the stalker’s quest for personal 
information about the victim and endow the stalker with an audience to the litany 
of abuses he or she claims to have suffered.38
Perpetrators become quite skilled at learning how to manipulate the limits 
of the criminal justice system by finding ways to harass which do not violate the 
34. Pathé, Mackenzie & Mullen, supra note 11 at 107.
35. Ibid. See e.g. R v VanEindhoven, 2013 NUCJ 30, (2013) 9 CR (7th) 94. In this tragic 
case, the victim left a violent relationship and only returned after repeated phone calls 
from the accused threatening to kill himself. On her return she was savagely beaten and 
stabbed to death.
36. The term “no contact order” is used in this article to refer to peace bonds imposed 
under the Criminal Code and protection orders or restraining orders imposed under 
provincial legislation.
37. Concern has been raised in British Columbia recently regarding a number of killings of 
women by intimate partners who were under no contact orders. See e.g. Andrea Woo 
& Justine Hunter, “Deaths show BC is failing victims of domestic violence, watchdog 
charges,” The Globe and Mail (13 May 2014) online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
british-columbia/spate-of-deaths-revives-criticism-of-bcs-domestic-violence-program/
article18631650>.
38. Supra note 11 at 108 [emphasis in original].
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terms of the legislation.39 Potentially vexatious family law proceedings are another 
mechanism by which perpetrators can disrupt the lives of complainants.40
Having demonstrated the seriousness of intimate partner criminal 
harassment, the article now turns to a brief review of the theoretical literature 
on “responsibilization” and the ways in which feminist insights in the context of 
sexual assault and intimate partner violence have informed our understanding 
of gendered violence. The article will then examine the judicial discourse on 
intimate partner criminal harassment against this framework.
II. THE RESPONSIBILIZATION OF GENDERED VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN
Criminologists have observed that the shift towards neoliberal economies has 
had an impact on governmental approaches to crime.41 In the context of crime 
prevention, “[n]eoliberalism valorizes the individual as the rational manager of his 
or her own risk portfolio.”42 According to David Garland, neoliberal societies have 
accepted “the premise that crime is a normal, commonplace, aspect of modern 
society” and that governments have limited ability to prevent or control it.43 
Crime becomes understood as a risk to be calculated, and crime prevention 
39. Ibid at 104.
40. See Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood in Maintaining the 
Traditional Family” (2009) 21 CJWL 315 at 333 (describing how courts continue to 
award access to fathers who are abusive to the mother). See also Marisa L Beeble, Deborah 
Bybee & Cris M Sullivan, “Abusive Men’s Use of Children to Control Their Partners and 
Ex-Partners” (2007) 12:1 Eur Psych 54 (describing how abusive men use their children as a 
means of controlling their intimate partners). See also Justice Unions’ Parliamentary Group, 
supra note 33 at 20. The Group recommended that the courts be given the authority to 
suspend the parental responsibilities of those who have been convicted of “serious” stalking 
offences who use vexatious applications for contact with children to get at the complainant 
(Recommendation 21) and the ability to impose civil orders preventing further applications 
in Family Court (Recommendation 23).
41. See e.g. David Garland, “‘Governmentality’ and the problem of crime: Foucault, criminology, 
sociology” (1997) 1:2 Theor Criminol 173; Kevin D Haggerty, “From Risk to Precaution: 
The Rationalities of Personal Crime Prevention” in Richard V Ericson & Aaron Doyle, eds, 
Risk and Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 193; Susan Ilcan, “Privatizing 
Responsibility: Public Sector Reform under Neoliberal Government” (2009) 46:3 Can Rev 
Soc 207; Pat O’Malley, “Risk and responsibility” in Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne & 
Nikolas Rose, eds, Foucault and political reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of 
government (London, UK: UCL Press, 1996) 189.
42. Haggerty, supra note 41 at 193.
43. David Garland, “The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in 
Contemporary Society” (1996) 36:4 Brit J Crim 445 at 450.
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strategies turn to “the conduct of potential victims, to vulnerable situations, and 
to those routines of everyday life which create criminal opportunities.”44 These 
neoliberal strategies have served to transform our understanding of the model 
citizen, who is now deemed the responsible and self-reliant individual whose 
reduced expectations of the state mean he or she does not make claims on that 
state.45 This idea that people are responsible for managing the risk they face on a 
day-to-day basis is referred to in this article as “responsibilization.”
While responsibilization is a relatively new concept in criminology, 
blaming women for the violence that is perpetrated against them is hardly a 
recent phenomenon. Rather, responsibilization can be seen as a return to placing 
responsibility on women for their own safety. As Leslie J Moran has aptly put it:
For women and non-heterosexuals who have long been denied State provision of 
safety and security, the rise of individual and private safety strategies is not so much 
a new development within the politics of crime control and thereby their social 
inclusion, but a long established feature of their social exclusion.46
Elizabeth Stanko notes that, “[i]n terms of personal violence, this positioning 
vis-a-vis danger is socially embedded within wider structures of age, class, race/
ethnicity, sexuality, masculinities and patriarchy … especially when negotiating 
physical and sexual safety with men.”47 Any understanding of responsibiliza-
tion in the context of intimate violence against women must, therefore, also 
be informed by feminist insights into the particular vulnerabilities to intimate 
violence that arise as a result of power imbalances based on gender. In that vein, 
feminist scholars have examined recent neoliberal value shifts and the rise of 
44. Ibid at 451.
45. Janine Brodie, Politics on the Margins: Restructuring and the Canadian Women’s Movement 
(Halifax: Fernwood, 1995) at 57-58. See also Wendy Brown, Edgework: Critical Essays on 
Knowledge and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) at 42. Brown argues 
that “neoliberalism equates moral responsibility with rational action” and “in so doing, it 
carries responsibility for the self to new heights: the rationally calculating individual bears full 
responsibility for the consequences of his or her action no matter how severe the constraints 
on this action.”
46. “Affairs of the Heart: Hate Crime and the Politics of Crime Control” (2001) 12:3 Law & 
Crit 331 at 337.
47. Elizabeth A Stanko, “Safety Talk: Conceptualizing Women’s Risk Assessment as a 
‘Technology of the Soul’” (1997) 1 Theor Criminol 479 at 483.
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responsibilization as it relates to women in the context of sexual assault and 
intimate partner violence.48
Nowhere is the tendency towards responsibilization more pervasive than in 
the context of sexual assault. Feminist scholars have documented the tendency 
both to blame women for the sexual violence they experience and to hold women 
responsible for avoiding sexual assault through proper avoidance activities.49 
Blaming women for sexual violence has a long history and manifests itself in 
numerous ways, such as how the complainant was dressed,50 her past choices of 
48. Outside of the criminal law context, see US case law on sexual harassment under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §2000e-2 (1991). These cases show a similar 
trend towards blaming the victim of harassment through its requirement of unwelcomeness 
whereby the plaintiff must show that the sexual harassment she experienced was not 
welcome. The US Supreme Court has indicated that the plaintiff’s speech and how she 
dresses in the workplace are relevant in the assessment of unwelcomeness. See Meritor 
Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57, 106 S Ct 2399 (1986). See also Ann C Juliano, “Did She 
Ask for It? The ‘Unwelcome’ Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases” (1991-1992) 77 
Cornell L Rev 1558 at 1586 (“Dress is not the only element courts consider when deciding 
‘welcomeness.’ A victim’s personality must be pristine enough to demonstrate that she did 
not invite the harassment. When courts engage in this inquiry, the plaintiff’s personality is 
put on trial.”) See also Christina A Bull, “The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual 
Harassment Plaintiff’s Speech and Dress in the Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson” 
(1994) 41 UCLA L Rev 117; Sandi Farrell, “Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A 
Critique of the Ideology of Voluntarism in Title VII Jurisprudence” (2003) 92 Ky LJ 483; 
Grace S Ho, “Not Quite Rights: How the Unwelcomeness Element in Sexual Harassment 
Law Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential” (2008) 20 Yale JL & Feminism 131; 
Wendy Pollack, “Sexual Harassment: Women’s Experience vs. Legal Definitions” (1990) 13 
Harv Women’s LJ 35.
49. See e.g. Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and ‘Ideal Victims’: Consent, 
Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22:2 CJWL 397 [Randall, “Ideal Victims”]; Lise 
Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape Activism on Neoliberal Terrain: The Garneau Sisterhood” in 
Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism 
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012) 243 [Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape Activism”]; 
Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent,” supra note 2; Stanko, supra note 47; Elizabeth 
Comack & Tracey Peter, “How the Criminal Justice System Responds to Sexual Assault 
Survivors: The Slippage between ‘Responsibilization’ and ‘Blaming the Victim’” (2005) 17:2 
CJWL 283; Janine Benedet, “The Sexual Assault of Intoxicated Women” (2010) 22:2 CJWL 
435 [Benedet, “Intoxicated Women”].
50. See e.g. R v Ewanchuk, 1998 ABCA 52, 212 AR 81. In this case, the Alberta Court of Appeal 
acquitted an accused of sexual assault in part because the complainant was not dressed in 
“a bonnet and crinolines” and because she lived with her boyfriend (ibid at para 4). The 
Supreme Court of Canada overruled this decision. See R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 
169 DLR (4th) 193 [Ewanchuk].
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sexual partners,51 or her mental health history.52 The responsibility for preventing 
sexual assault is only a slightly more subtle form of victim blaming: women 
are acknowledged as potential victims, but are responsible for taking steps to 
avoid that victimization. As Lise Gotell has explained, “[w]ithin the neoliberal 
regime of responsibility, populations are divided on the basis of their capacity for 
self-management; those women who can be represented as failing to adhere to the 
rules of sexual safekeeping are in turn blamed for the violence they experience.”53 
Victim blaming makes sexual assault an individualized phenomenon that 
depends largely on the behaviour of the complainant. It replaces the notion 
of public responsibility for social issues such as violence against women with a 
“decontextualized, de-gendered focus on ‘problematic’ individuals.”54 This leads 
to what Melanie Randall refers to as “disappearing perpetrators” where, rather 
than focusing on the perpetrator himself and the social, political, and economic 
contexts that perpetuate male violence against women, attention is focused on 
the individual victim.55 Women are divided into good and bad victims: those 
deserving of a legal response to violence against them on the one hand, and those 
who are perceived as ‘unrapeable,’ such as women with mental disabilities56 or 
women involved in prostitution, on the other.57 Racialized and other marginal-
ized women feel this burden disproportionately and are, in turn, deemed less 
valuable and less credible when their safety efforts fail; they are thus more likely 
to be stigmatized as “bad” or “undeserving” victims.58
Gotell has described the tendency towards risk management and sexual 
safekeeping in response to sexual assault as the primary governmental technology 
for responding to sexual assault. Sexual assault becomes “something that 
51. See e.g. Lise Gotell, “When Privacy Is Not Enough: Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual 
History Evidence and the Disclosure of Personal Records” (2006) 43:3 Alta L Rev 743 
[Gotell, “When Privacy Is Not Enough”].
52. See Katharine D Kelly, “‘You must be crazy if you think you were raped’: Reflections 
on the Use of Complainants’ Personal and Therapy Records in Sexual Assault Trials” 
(1997) 9:1 CJWL 178.
53. Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape Activism,” supra note 49 at 257.
54. Randall, “Ideal Victims,” supra note 49 at 409.
55. Ibid at 423. See also Benedet, “Marital Rape,” supra note 3 at 164; Janine Benedet & Isabel 
Grant, “Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Power and Authority for Women with Mental 
Disabilities” (2014) 22:2 Fem Legal Stud 131.
56. Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with 
Mental Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief ” (2007) 52 McGill LJ 243.
57. Randall, “Ideal Victims,” supra note 49 at 409.
58. Ibid at 410.
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individual women should try to avoid.”59 The ideal victim is constituted as “the 
rape-preventing subject who exercises appropriate caution (yet fails).”60 As Gotell 
notes, “[t]he new ‘ideal’ and valorized victim is a responsible, security conscious, 
crime-preventing subject who acts to minimize her own sexual risk.”61 Women 
and girls from a young age are taught to negotiate their physical and sexual 
safety.62 Avoiding victimization at the hands of men has become a regularized 
part of many women’s daily routine.63 Teaching girls and young women to avoid 
the ever-present risk of male violence has become so normalized that it is rarely 
questioned. For example, women and girls are expected to avoid alcohol, to guard 
their drinks vigorously to avoid being drugged, not to dress ‘provocatively,’ not to 
walk home at night alone, and never to leave an event with a stranger.64 Virtually 
all of these precautions, of course, falsely assume that women are in more danger 
from strangers than from people they know.
Historically, the tendency to view male violence against women in intimate 
relationships as a private matter between the partners has greatly hindered law 
enforcement approaches to intimate partner violence.65 More recently, criminol-
ogists have documented the trend towards putting the responsibility for avoiding 
intimate partner violence on the victim and her family members.66 Martin 
Silverstein and Roberta Spark explore how programs for battered women focus 
on having women “increasingly take full responsibility for their well-being even 
59. Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape Activism,” supra note 49 at 245.
60. Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent,” supra note 2 at 866.
61. Ibid at 879.
62. Stanko, supra note 47 at 485, 487; “Truro mom fights school dress code after shorts deemed 
too short,” CBC News (13 May 2014) online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/
truro-mom-fights-school-dress-code-after-shorts-deemed-too-short-1.2641525>.
63. Stanko, supra note 47 at 488.
64. Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape Activism,” supra note 49 at 252.
65. See Frances Olsen, “Constitutional law: Feminist critiques of the public/private distinction” 
(1993) 10 Const Commentary 319 at 323 (explaining that intimate partner violence has 
historically not been vigorously prosecuted because it was seen as a “private” family matter). 
See also Catherine Moore, “Women and Domestic Violence: The Public/Private Dichotomy 
in International Law” (2003) 7:4 Int’l JHR 93; Jennifer Koshan, “Sounds of Silence: 
The Public/Private Dichotomy, Violence, and Aboriginal Women” in Susan B Boyd, ed, 
Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1997) at 87.
66. “Social Bridges Falling Down: Reconstructing a ‘Troublesome Population’ of Battered 
Women through Individual Responsibilization Strategies” (2007) 15:4 Crit Criminol 327 
(The authors note, “Historically, the responsibility for domestic violence is shifted from the 
batterer to the community, from the community to the police, from the police to individual 
victims, to family members of victims, and to the community of the victim” at 328).
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as governments take less and less responsibility for making social change affecting 
their situation.”67 As a result, they argue, some programs for battered women 
present ultimatums to powerless women about how they have to live their lives in 
the same way that batterers present ultimatums to their female victims.68 Victims 
of intimate partner violence are expected to develop safety plans that give them 
strategies for avoiding or escaping from the abuser.69 As Carolyn Hoyle notes, 
“victims are made individually accountable–in part, at least–for minimizing the 
risk of future violence”70 by developing and sticking with their safety plan. Such 
strategies may be useful in a context where there is no relationship between a 
perpetrator and victim, but they become much more complex when dealing 
with women who have had an intimate relationship with the abuser, particularly 
where ongoing access to children is involved.71
The preceding insights about responsibilization, as informed by a gendered 
analysis, are useful for examining criminal harassment prosecutions—specifically, 
the requirements in section 264 that the Crown prove the complainant was afraid 
for her safety or the safety of others, that her fear was reasonable, and that the 
accused knew or was reckless with respect to the fact that she was harassed. While 
the treatment of female complainants in the criminal harassment context may 
not be as dire a situation as we have seen in the context of sexual assault over the 
past several decades, there are worrisome similarities. For example, women are 
doubted if there is an absence of physical violence or threats thereof.72 There is a 
tendency to attribute to women ulterior motives for bringing claims of criminal 
harassment, for example, to obtain an advantage in legal proceedings.73 This 
67. Ibid at 331.
68. Ibid at 337.
69. Carolyn Hoyle, “Will she be safe? A critical analysis of risk assessment in domestic violence 
cases” (2008) 30:3 Child Youth Serv Rev 323 at 331-32.
70. Ibid at 332.
71. Ibid. Hoyle points out that these kinds of measures may be useful when dealing with a crime 
like burglary, where the assumption is that victims are rational actors. But, in the context 
of intimate partner violence (like with intimate partner criminal harassment), victims are 
often emotionally committed to the perpetrator and their choices are restricted by his 
controlling behaviours.
72. See e.g. R v E(PJJ), 2003 BCPC 511 at para 34, 2003 CarswellBC 3529 [PJJE]; R v Russo, 
2013 ONSC 4730 at para 20, [2013] OJ No 1736 [Russo]; R v Seaton, 2012 ONSC 6070 at 
para 18, 104 WCB (2d) 183 [Seaton]; R v MacLean, 2008 ONCJ 30 at para 3, 77 WCB (2d) 
211 [MacLean]; R v Esau, [1997] 2 SCR 777 at 789, 812, 148 DLR (4th) 662.
73. See e.g. R v Chancellor, 2012 BCSC 1993 at para 67, [2012] BCJ No 2799 (QL) 
[Chancellor]. In this case, Dley J observed that the complainants (the accused’s ex-wife and 
her fiancé) had exaggerated their evidence, likely to gain an advantage in ongoing family 
litigation over assets and access to the children.
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trend reproduces the tendency in sexual assault law to believe that women bring 
claims falsely, contact police, and assert fear where they in fact have none. As 
with sexual assault, a woman’s credibility is more likely to be doubted if she has a 
previous intimate relationship with her harasser.74
Most notably, there is an expectation that women are responsible for 
avoiding criminal harassment and thus must respond to harassment in particular 
ways if they want the criminal justice system to acknowledge the crime. Police 
and other agencies often tell women complaining of harassment to change their 
lives to minimize risk.75 A complainant is told not to frequent locations where the 
potential accused might be, to change her route to and from work or home, to 
change her phone number or not to take his calls, to install an alarm system, and, 
in extreme cases, to leave the jurisdiction.76 It is up to the responsible complainant 
to block attempts at harassment even if that requires that she seriously curtail her 
daily activities and mobility.77 Sometimes women are faced with contradictory 
messages: on the one hand, do not communicate with the accused under any 
circumstances. On the other hand, make sure you communicate to him that you 
are harassed. If she fails, or chooses not to take such steps, no matter what her 
reasons, the seriousness and the very legitimacy of the harassment allegation may 
be questioned.78
74. Crocker, supra note 10 at 107-08.
75. Department of Justice Canada, A Handbook for Police and Crown Prosecutors on Criminal 
Harassment (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2012) at 25, online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/har/EN-CHH2.pdf>.
76. One study concluded that female college students who engage in drinking and drug use 
were at greater risk of being stalked than were women who abstain from these behaviours, 
implicitly suggesting that that the complainant’s behaviour is responsible for the harassment. 
Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine & Richard Tewksbury, “A Routine Activities Theory 
Explanation for Women’s Stalking Victimizations” (1999) 5:1 Violence Against Women 43.
77. For this line of reasoning in the sexual assault context, see Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape 
Activism,” supra note 49 at 256.
78. For cases in which the court used the complainant’s contact with the accused to acquit, see 
R v Moyse, 2010 MBPC 21 at paras 55-56, 252 Man LR (2d) 52 [Moyse]; R v Benoit, 2009 
ONCJ 441 at para 11, 84 WCB (2d) 1073 [Benoit]; Seaton, supra note 72 at paras 86-89; 
R v Gilmar, 2010 ABPC 332 at para 42, [2010] AJ No 1436 (QL) [Gilmar]; R v W(J), 
2010 ONCJ 194 at para 29, 88 WCB (2d) 325 [JW]. For cases in which the accused was 
acquitted because the complainant did not communicate that behaviour was harassing, see 
R v Frohlich, 2010 ABQB 260 at paras 49-50, 54-55, 495 AR 128 [Frohlich]; R v Ross, 2006 
PESCTD 11 at paras 31-32, 256 Nfld & PEIR 25 [Ross]; R v Benjamin, 2010 ONSC 5799 
at paras 43-45, 90 WCB (2d) 507 [Benjamin].
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This responsibilization creates the illusion that whether criminal harassment 
ceases or escalates depends on the behaviour of the complainant and is not within 
the control of the accused. In fact, very little evidence supports the suggestion 
that the complainant’s behaviour can have a significant impact on harassment. 
In some cases, a particular intervention makes things better. In other cases, the 
same intervention makes things worse or makes no difference whatsoever.79 
Responsibilization obscures the role of the perpetrator and the state in stopping 
the harassment.80
III.  THE CASES
A. INTRODUCTION
The data for this study consisted of all trial and appellate decisions available on 
Quicklaw, decided between June 1, 2002 and the search date in April, 2013, that 
either decided charges of criminal harassment (i.e. conviction or acquittal), or 
pronounced sentence for accused persons who pled guilty or were found guilty of 
79. Social science studies substantiate the unpredictability of how a perpetrator will respond 
to different interventions. The results tend to show that different legal responses, for 
example seeking a no contact order, sometimes reduce the harassment for a victim of 
criminal harassment, while other times they make it worse. It is plausible to suggest that 
the complainant may often be in the best position to know what kinds of responses will 
antagonize her abuser. See e.g. Dutton & Winstead, supra note 11 at 1135. They state, 
“Thus, research indicates that some of the responses work some of the time, but no particular 
response is effective all (or most) of the time. Some research suggests that no responses 
are effective.”
80. A similar trend towards responsibilization can be seen in the social science literature. Social 
scientists have studied what types of behaviours women should engage in to minimize the 
impact of criminal harassment. See e.g. Dutton & Winstead, supra note 11; Goldsworthy 
& Raj, supra note 19. Goldsworthy & Raj describe women as engaging in “[r]einforcing 
behaviours such as picking up the phone after the stalker has attempted to call 40 times 
in a row” (ibid at 185). Different victim typologies have been developed to categorize how 
women respond to criminal harassment, deeming some responses to be more appropriate 
than others, even though there is no established response to criminal harassment that stops 
the harassment with even a majority of perpetrators (ibid at 185-86; Dutton & Winstead, 
supra note 11 at 1131-32).
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criminal harassment at trial. A total of 348 decisions met these criteria.81 Many 
of them also involved charges other than criminal harassment. As this article is 
focused on intimate partner criminal harassment, the cases were separated into 
two groups. The first group includes all cases in which a complainant had had an 
“intimate relationship” with the accused. This term is defined broadly to include 
marital, common law, and dating relationships. This group includes cases in 
which the harassment arose out of an intimate relationship, even if other people 
were also harassed (e.g., where the accused harassed both his former intimate 
partner and her new partner). Of the 348 cases, 199 (57%) were classified as 
intimate partner cases, and all but one involved heterosexual relationships. The 
second group consisted of cases in which the relationship between the accused 
and complainant was not one of current or former intimate partnership. Into this 
group fell 101 cases (29%). A further 48 cases (14%) in which it was not possible 
to determine the relationship between the parties were eliminated from the 
sample. While the study is mainly qualitative and does not present any statistical 
analysis, a few quantitative comments about the overall findings are useful.
While there is no way to determine whether these cases constitute a representa-
tive sample of criminal harassment cases, these findings are remarkably consistent 
with larger government studies on criminal harassment.82 In the overall sample, 
93% of accused were men and 81% of complainants were women. However, the 
gender breakdown was more distinct in the intimate partner cases, with 96% 
of the accused being men (as compared to 87% in the non-intimate partner 
group). In these cases, 92% of complainants were women, as compared to 68% 
of complainants in the non-intimate partner cases. These findings support the 
81. The cases were found by searching the LexisNexis Quicklaw database for all cases with the 
search string “crim! /5 harass!” decided after May 2002. This date was chosen because it was 
the end date of the search conducted for the last study on this topic. See Grant, Bone & 
Grant, supra note 8. In Quicklaw, this search string produces all cases in which any word 
beginning with “crim” is found within 5 words of any word beginning with “harass.” This 
search string produced 1252 cases in late April 2013. Approximately two-thirds of the cases 
were eliminated from the sample as they were either civil, family, or some other kind of 
case that simply happened to mention those words, or because they were a criminal case in 
which the words were mentioned for some reason other than a trial, appeal, or sentencing 
proceeding. Four French-language decisions that turned up in the sample were also excluded, 
for reasons of consistency.
82. See e.g. Shelly Milligan, Statistics Canada, Juristat Bulletin Article: Criminal Harassment 
in Canada, 2009 (Ottawa: StatCan, 2011) at 3, online: <www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-
005-x/2011001/article/11407-eng.pdf>; Statistics Canada, Family Violence, supra 
note 30 at 35-37.
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suggestion that intimate partner criminal harassment in particular is a highly 
gendered crime that is predominantly committed by men against women.
The overall conviction rate across all cases was approximately 71%. The 
conviction rate was higher in the non-intimate partner group (72.3%) as 
compared to the intimate partner group (69.8%).83 When the conviction rate 
was broken down by gender and relationship, male intimate partner accused were 
more likely to be convicted than female intimate partner accused (70.2% versus 
62.5%). In the non-intimate partner group, the opposite pattern was evident—
women were more likely to be convicted (76.9% versus 71.6% for men). In both 
groups, the number of female accused was so small that it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions from the differences in conviction rate by gender.
In almost one-third of the intimate partner cases, the accused was under a 
no contact order at the time the criminal harassment took place, highlighting the 
ineffectiveness of such orders. In intimate partner cases where the accused had 
some sort of no contact order with respect to the complainant, the conviction 
rate was almost 86%, significantly higher than the average. This pattern was 
even more striking for women accused where 100% of those under some form 
of no contact order were convicted. Again, it is difficult to draw conclusions, 
as the numbers are very small, with only four women under pre-existing no 
contact orders.
In the vast majority of intimate partner cases, the accused harasses someone 
of the opposite sex. In one case involving same-sex intimate partner criminal 
harassment, the accused harassed his former male partner.84 In the other eight 
intimate partner cases involving accused persons and complainants of the same 
gender (five male accused and three female accused), the harassment was directed 
83. While this conviction rate appears significantly higher than that usually cited for sexual 
assault (most statistics suggest the conviction rate for sexual assault is below 50%), it is 
important to note that the figures presented in this article only include cases where written 
judgments were issued. Thus, it is impossible to compare these numbers with statistics 
based on charges laid or even all cases that have gone to trial. See Mia Dauvergne, Statistics 
Canada, Adult Criminal Court Statistics in Canada, 2010/2011 (Ottawa: StatCan, 28 
May 2012) at 25.
84. See R v Wenc, 2009 ABCA 328, 460 AR 366. This case involved a man who criminally 
harassed his former male partner after their relationship ended. The accused was sentenced 
to 90 days intermittent imprisonment. The Court of Appeal indicated that 12 months 
imprisonment would have been an appropriate sentence, but it did not grant leave to appeal 
because the accused had served his sentence. It is unclear whether police are less likely to lay 
charges in same-sex intimate partner harassment or whether police are less likely to become 
involved initially. This would be a fruitful avenue of further research as part of the study of 
violence in same-sex intimate relationships.
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at the new partner of the former intimate partner.85 In all but one case where 
harassment was directed at a new partner, the former intimate partner was also 
a complainant.86
An initial objective of this study was to compare the judicial treatment of 
male and female accused in intimate partner criminal harassment cases. However, 
it is extremely difficult to draw any conclusions from the female accused cases. 
There are only eight women accused of intimate partner harassment in the 
database. Five of those eight decisions are sentencing decisions in which the 
elements of the offence, such as reasonable fear and mens rea, have already been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt.87 The three trial decisions all resulted in 
acquittals.88 In one of these cases, R v Blohm, the charge appeared to be unsubstan-
tiated.89 The trial judge found that none of the elements of the actus reus could 
be made out as the accused had not engaged in any of the enumerated harassing 
conduct or caused fear. The male complainant had locked the accused out of 
her home (and denied her access to her possessions) when she was away visiting 
her grandchildren, forcing her to stay in a shelter on her return. There was no 
evidence that she had harassed the female complainant (the male complainant’s 
new girlfriend), nor that she had come to the house knowing that the female 
complainant would be there.
The other two cases involved women seeking access to their children, who 
were in the midst of custody disputes with their male partners. In R v Harper, the 
accused was convicted of a number of charges relating to mischief and obstructing 
the police. Nevertheless, she was acquitted of criminal harassment because the 
level of distress she caused her husband when she drove by his house and made 
obscene gestures was insufficient.90 There was no discussion of the details of the 
husband’s response to the harassment, nor of whether he responded reasonably. 
85. R v Blohm, 2011 NSPC 51, [2011] NSJ No 440 (QL) [Blohm]; R v Prakash, 2009 ONCJ 
197, [2009] OJ No 1928 (QL) [Prakash]; Chancellor, supra note 73; R v O’Reilly, [2006] NJ 
No 214 (QL) (Prov Ct); R v Ibrahim, 2011 ONSC 4252, [2011] OJ No 3331(QL), aff’d 
2014 ONCA 355, 113 WCB (2d) 506; R v Zgraggen (2011), 101 WCB (2d) 648, [2011] OJ 
No 4556 (QL) (Ct J); R v Smysniuk, 2007 SKQB 453, 306 Sask R 270; R v Bachmaier, 2010 
ONCJ 11, [2009] OJ No 5761 (QL) [Bachmaier].
86. Ibid.
87. R v Hrabanek, [2005] AJ No 1941 (QL), 2005 CarswellAlta 2697 [Hrabanek]; R v Marsden, 
2004 BCPC 369, [2004] BCJ No 2112 (QL); Prakash, supra note 85; R v Shaw, 2012 ABPC 
273, [2012] AJ No 1024 (QL); R v Porter, 2002 BCPC 641, 2002 CarswellBC 3388.
88. Blohm, supra note 85; R v Harper, 2007 ONCJ 125, 76 WCB (2d) 440 [Harper]; R v KAM, 
2002 SKPC 105, 55 WCB (2d) 670 [KAM].
89. Blohm, supra note 85.
90. Harper, supra note 88 at para 47.
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In R v KAM, the accused had been trying to establish contact with her children 
whom she had not seen for 8 months.91 The trial judge believed that her only 
purpose in repeatedly leaving messages for the complainant was to contact her 
children through her former spouse.
Overall, there were not enough cases from which to draw general conclusions. 
While there may be stereotypes about men responding to female violence, I was 
unable to find evidence of the discourse of responsibilization in the cases dealing 
with the elements of the offence.92 The cases did not reveal any conception of 
how a reasonable man responds to harassment by a female former partner.
B. EXAMINING JUDICIAL DISCOURSES
Looking at reported decisions, of course, does not give one a complete picture of 
criminal harassment cases in Canada. In a majority of cases, charges are probably 
never laid. Many charges are dropped, sometimes in exchange for the accused 
entering into a no contact order. Many charges of criminal harassment that do 
proceed are resolved by guilty pleas.93 In some cases, behaviour that could be 
considered criminal harassment may be charged as assault, uttering threats, or 
some other crime. Such cases are not identified as a criminal harassment case. 
Nonetheless, the present sample does give an indication of how judges are dealing 
with the cases that get to trial, and of the attitudes that inform their decisions. As 
such, the case analysis in this article is more a study of judicial attitudes towards 
intimate partner criminal harassment than of the phenomenon of criminal 
harassment itself.
As Gotell has demonstrated in the context of sexual assault, judicial 
discourses are an important site for the reconstruction of normative heterosexu-
ality and sexual citizenship.94 Thus, “scrutinizing judicial discourses reveals both 
the shifting terms upon which the ‘good victim’ is defined and a changing set 
91. KAM, supra note 88 at para 46.
92. See Hrabanek, supra note 87 at para 5. In Hrabanek, the court suggested that the 
complainant should not have continued contact with the accused (i.e., he met her for 
coffee on more than one occasion). What is interesting is that the trial judge said it was 
nonetheless obvious that the male complainant was afraid and that anybody would have 
been afraid because of the complainant’s persistence. Thus, the ongoing contact did not 
negate his fear. Further, making this observation in sentencing has a very different impact 
given that the accused has already been convicted and the elements of criminal harassment 
already established.
93. Gill & Brockman, supra note 31 at 34.
94. Gotell, “The Discursive Disappearance,” supra note 2 at 132-33.
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of justifications for disqualifying claims of sexual violence.”95 In the context of 
criminal harassment, these discourses both shape and reflect how the “responsible 
victim” of criminal harassment is constructed.96 The power of judicial discourses 
can also act to silence women who encounter the law.97 This is especially true 
of those women who do not comply with the construction of the “responsible 
victim.” Decisions that embody these discourses signal to men that they are 
not criminally responsible for instilling fear if, for example, their ex-partner 
occasionally agrees to see them or responds to their texts or communications. 
Such discourses may also affect women’s choices, either in how they respond 
to harassment or whether they report it to police, potentially exposing them to 
greater danger.
The central claim of this article is that the elements of criminal harassment 
as defined in section 264, specifically the requirements that the complainant be 
reasonably fearful and that the accused know that he is harassing her, lead judges 
to put the onus on women to prevent intimate partner criminal harassment and 
to behave like ‘proper victims.’ Given my focus on the elements of the offence, 
trial decisions and appeals therefrom were generally more useful than sentencing 
decisions. Other aspects of criminal harassment under section 264 may also 
create barriers to prosecution, such as the requirement that harassing behaviour 
take place repeatedly.98 I focus, however, on the fear requirement and the mens rea 
requirement (the accused’s knowledge) because problematic assumptions about 
how women should respond to harassment arise most often in these elements.
In Part III(C), below, I turn first to the requirements that the woman 
be afraid and that her fear be reasonable, and then examine the requirement 
that the accused know he is harassing the complainant (the mens rea element). 
For each of these elements, there are numerous examples of judges expecting 
women to behave in particular ways that either illustrate societal expectations of 
a frightened woman or place the responsibility on her to make sure the accused 
knows that he is harassing her. Evidence of this trend is not found in every 
case, nor necessarily in a majority of cases. However, as the following cases will 
95. Ibid at 135.
96. See also Carissima Mathen, “Crowdsourcing Sexual Objectification” (2014) 3:3 Laws 529 
at 542. Mathen discusses the expressive role that criminal law plays in society generally. In 
playing this expressive role, “it gives effect to broader intuitions about criminal wrongdoing, 
and it shapes and transmits crucial benchmarks by which citizens may guide their behaviour.”
97. Carol Smart, Law, Crime and Sexuality: Essays in Feminism (London: Sage 
Publications, 1995) at 71.
98. Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 264(2). For example, two of the four types of behaviour listed 
in s 264(2) must be performed repeatedly before liability attaches.
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demonstrate, it is present often enough to raise concerns about the elements 
of criminal harassment and the judicial interpretation thereof. One can only 
speculate about the number of charges that were not laid or that never proceeded 
to trial because police or prosecutors employed similar logic, or because women 
are deterred altogether from going to police because they know they will not be 
construed as an ideal victim.
C. AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTIMATE PARTNER CRIMINAL HARASSMENT 
CASES: THE JUDICIAL DISCOURSE OF RESPONSIBILIZATION
1. REASONABLE FEAR FOR ONE’S SAFETY OR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS
Section 264(1) requires that the Crown prove that the accused caused the 
complainant “reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear for [her] safety or 
the safety of anyone known to [her].”99 This requirement has both a subjective 
component, which asks whether the complainant actually felt afraid for her safety, 
and an objective component, which asks whether that fear was reasonable “in all 
the circumstances.” The requirement that the complainant be afraid means that 
women will have to testify about their fear and be subject to cross-examination 
regarding its honesty and its reasonableness. Where the accused is unrepre-
sented by counsel, he will likely conduct that cross-examination himself.100 
This reasonable fear requirement may also expose the complainant’s character 
and mental health history to challenge, creating the potential for further abuse 
by the accused.101
While most judges recognize, at least in theory, that the well-established 
judicial interpretation of “safety” includes psychological or emotional safety as 
99. Ibid, s 264(1).
100. Birenbaum & Grant, supra note 22. This problem has been acknowledged in the sexual 
assault context. Section 486.3(1) enables the Crown or a witness to apply to prevent 
an accused cross-examining a witness under 18 years of age and s 486.3(2) allows the 
judge to order that the accused shall not personally cross-examine any witness if it would 
impede obtaining a full and candid account of her evidence. The judge should consider 
her age, whether she has a disability, the nature of the offence, and the nature of the 
relationship between the witness and the accused. See Criminal Code, supra note 3, ss 
486.1(3), 486.3(1)-(2).
101. Pathé, Mackenzie & Mullen, supra note 11 at 105. There were no cases in this sample where 
the record was clear that an application had been made for access to psychiatric records of 
the complainant.
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well as physical safety,102 the threshold for psychological safety established in 
the case law is extremely high and inevitably involves difficult line drawing.103 
For example, it is not uncommon for judges to state that it is insufficient if the 
complainant is “vexed, disquieted or annoyed”; rather, she must be “tormented, 
troubled, worried continually or chronically, plagued, bedevilled and badgered.”104 
In several cases, the court found the complainant to be annoyed and stressed, but 
not sufficiently annoyed and stressed.105 In one such example, the accused sent 
sexually explicit photographs of the complainant to her employer and several 
other people, while the complainant went on disability leave from work, took 
prescription medication, and received counselling. The court, relying on the test 
for psychological safety above, concluded that the impact on her was vexing and 
annoying, but not disturbing enough.106 In other cases, the issue of psychological 
safety is not expressly considered and criminal harassment charges are rejected 
because there were no threats of violence or physical harm to the complainant.107
The burden of proof is of course on the Crown to establish, through the 
complainant, both the fear and its reasonableness. Yet there is no inquiry into 
the reasonableness of the accused’s harassing actions. Judges interrogate how 
the complainant responded to the harassment: did she take steps to avoid the 
accused,108 did she alter her life so as to prevent the possibility of harassment,109 
did she avoid taking any actions that might be interpreted as inconsistent with 
102. See e.g. R v Goodwin (1997), 89 BCAC 269 at para 14, 34 WCB (2d) 408 (CA); R v 
Vandoodeward (2009), 86 WCB (2d) 89, [2009] OJ No 5099 (QL) at paras 72-73 (Sup Ct); 
R v Korbut, 2012 ONCJ 522 at para 25, [2012] OJ No 3895 (QL).
103. See PJJE, supra note 72 at para 37. The judge explicitly recognized the fineness of the 
distinction: “It may be more accurate to say that the Accused’s conduct caused her a great 
deal of stress and it may be splitting hairs to say that it was stress rather than fear that 
she was feeling.”
104. See e.g. R v Greenberg, 2010 ONSC 3584 at para 101, [2010] OJ No 3934 (QL) [Greenberg].
105. See e.g. R v Gibb, [2005] OJ No 3057 at para 64 (QL) (Ct J) [Gibb]; JW, supra note 
78 at para 30; R v Hassan, [2009] OJ No 1378 (QL), 2009 CanLII 15447 at para 31 
(Sup Ct) [Hassan].
106. See e.g. ibid. In Hassan, the trial judge applied this test and found that the threat to distribute 
sexually explicit photos of the complainant was vexing and annoying but did not meet the 
standard required by s 264.
107. See e.g. PJJE, supra note 72 at para 38; Russo, supra note 72 at para 75; MacLean, supra 
note 72 at para 9.
108. Moyse, supra note 78 at paras 85-86; Gilmar, supra note 78 at para 42.
109. Moyse, supra note 78 at para 87.
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fear,110 did she communicate to him the fact that his conduct was harassing,111 
did she complain to the police promptly enough,112 did she seek a no contact 
order,113 and was the harassment objectively “bad enough” to allow us to label 
her fear as reasonable and the harassment as criminal?114 As in sexual assault law, 
judges are assessing a woman’s response to a highly traumatic series of events 
and determining whether that response is adequate for acknowledgement by 
the criminal justice system. Judges make assumptions about how one should 
respond to what may have been a persistent, ongoing course of harassment by 
someone with whom the complainant may share children and a long history. 
For example, the fact that a woman does not contact police immediately may 
be used to discredit her allegations, even though there may be numerous reasons 
for trying to resolve problems with a former intimate partner without immediate 
110. R v Monahan, 2010 SKPC 46 at para 77, 194 ACWS (3d) 1124 [Monahan].
111. Frohlich, supra note 78 at paras 54-56; Moyse, supra note 78 at paras 85, 91; Benoit, supra 
note 78 at para 11; Seaton, supra note 72 at para 87.
112. Chancellor, supra note 73 at paras 77, 85. The fact that some women may not report criminal 
harassment immediately to police, and the tendency of courts to use that fact to cast doubt 
on her fear, can be analogized to the recent complaint doctrine that has plagued sexual assault 
complaints. While this doctrine was statutorily repealed in 1983, as Elaine Craig points out, 
the myths and stereotypes on which the doctrine is based are still prevalent in sexual assault 
prosecutions. See Elaine Craig, “The Relevance of Delayed Disclosure to Complainant 
Credibility in Cases of Sexual Assault” (2011) 36:2 Queen’s LJ 551. In sexual assault cases, 
a failure to report a sexual assault promptly is used to suggest that a woman is fabricating 
her allegations. In criminal harassment, the same kinds of problematic assumptions are used 
primarily to cast doubt on the alleged fear and distress experienced by the complainant. 
In both contexts, assumptions and stereotypes have developed about how women should 
respond to male violence. Women are disbelieved if they fail to live up to these stereotypical 
expectations (see ibid at 555-56). See also Elizabeth Sheehy, Defending Battered Women on 
Trial (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) at 241. Sheehy notes in her work on battered women, 
if we only believe women who complain to police or friends about abuse, the most seriously 
abused women will be eliminated because these are the women who never go to police.
113. See e.g. R v Wease, [2008] OJ No 1938 at para 23 (QL), 78 WCB (2d) 381 (Sup Ct) [Wease]. 
In Wease, the complainant’s fear was doubted because she did not seek a no contact order 
even though she did contact police. See also Ross, supra note 78 at para 39.
114. PJJE, supra note 72 at paras 38, 41; R v MDP, 2005 BCPC 288 at para 34, [2005] BCJ No 
1615 (QL) [MDP]; Frohlich, supra note 78 at paras 50, 75.
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police involvement.115 Some women expressed the concern, for example, that if 
they contacted the police, the accused’s behaviour would escalate.116
In the present study, there were 57 acquittals in the 193 intimate partner cases 
involving male accused. Of the 57 acquittals, more than half (33 cases) were based 
on some aspect of the complainant’s fear being inadequate: the complainant was 
not afraid, her fear was not reasonable, or both.117 In an earlier study of the criminal 
harassment provisions, Isabel Grant, Natasha Bone, and Kathy Grant found that 
courts were likely to conclude that a woman was subjectively afraid.118 Thus in 
the current study, I expected to find that in most cases where repeated harassment 
was found, the subjective fear component would be found to be satisfied and 
the question would then be whether the fear was reasonable. To the contrary, 
the current study found that the subjective component of the fear creates more 
problems for complainants than the reasonableness requirement. In 21 intimate 
partner cases, the court concluded that the complainant was not subjectively 
115. Chancellor, supra note 73 at paras 77, 85.
116. See e.g. R v Mustaka, 2006 BCPC 174 at para 7, [2006] BCWLD 4919 [Mustaka]. There 
is much social science evidence demonstrating that the decision for women to involve 
the police in issues of intimate partner violence or threats is complex. See e.g. Betty Jo 
Barrett, Melissa St Pierre & Nadine Vaillancourt, “Police Response to Intimate Partner 
Violence in Canada: Do Victim Characteristics Matter?” (2011) 21:1 Women & Crim J 
38; Caroline Akers & Catherine Kaukinen, “The Police Reporting Behavior of Intimate 
Partner Violence Victims” (2009) 24:3 J Fam Viol 159. It should be noted that s 264(4) 
makes it an aggravating factor in sentencing if the accused was in violation of a protective 
order at the time of the harassment. This demonstrates that a no contact order should not be 
seen as a requirement of establishing criminal harassment, but rather as a factor that makes 
the harassment even more serious where it is present. Where the harassment exists in the 
context of a no contact order, a lower threshold of mens rea and of fear on the part of the 
complainant should be required.
117. This reasonableness requirement attached to the fear was the subject of much early criticism. 
See Cairns Way, supra note 10 at 396; Grant, Bone & Grant, supra note 8 at 203-04.
118. Ibid at 196.
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afraid for her safety.119 In 15 cases, her fear was labelled unreasonable,120 and this 
finding was often made without analysis following a finding of no subjective 
fear.121 Women asserted fear in these cases but were disbelieved.
119. R v Carter, [2004] OJ No 5167 at para 9 (QL), 67 WCB (2d) 279 (Sup Ct) [Carter] 
(the court suggested that the trial judge erred in failing to assess the credibility of the 
complainant’s evidence regarding her fear); Gibb, supra note 105 at para 64; R v Vanin, 
2006 SKPC 86, 287 Sask R 58 at paras 62-64 [Vanin]; R v Lincoln, 2008 ONCJ 14 at paras 
24-26, 77 WCB (2d) 104 [Lincoln]; R v Lukaniuk, 2009 ONCJ 21 at para 17, 81 WCB (2d) 
517 [Lukaniuk]; Hassan, supra note 105 at para 31; Gilmar, supra note 78 at para 42; JW, 
supra note 78 at para 30; Moyse, supra note 78 at para 91; Monahan, supra note 110 at para 
77; R v Barkho, 2011 ONCJ 543 at para 48, [2011] OJ No 4949 (QL) [Barkho]; Blohm, 
supra note 85 at para 44; Chancellor, supra note 73 at paras 69, 92; Ross, supra note 78 at 
para 32; Wease, supra note 113 at para 23 (the court questioned the complainant’s fear as she 
did not seek a no contact order); R v Lenser, [2003] OJ No 3617 at para 28 (QL), 59 WCB 
(2d) 141 (Ct J) [Lenser]; R v Wolfe, 2008 BCPC 119 at paras 44-45, [2008] BCWLD 4044 
[Wolfe]; Frohlich, supra note 78 at paras 66, 75; R v Victoria-Penuela, 2011 ONCJ 572 at 
paras 118-119, [2011] OJ No 5130 (QL) [Victoria-Penuela]; Russo, supra note 72 at para 75; 
Greenberg, supra note 104.
120. PJJE, supra note 72 at para 41; MDP, supra note 114 at para 34; R v V(T), 2006 ONCJ 338 
at para 144, [2006] OJ No 4089 (QL) [TV]; Benoit, supra note 78 at para 11; Bachmaier, 
supra note 85 at para 60; R v Nkony, 2010 BCPC 73 at para 73, [2010] BCWL 7606 
[Nkony]; R v Benedict, [2003] OJ No 4300 at para 25 (QL), 59 WCB (2d) 288 (Ct J) 
[Benedict]; Benjamin, supra note 78 at para 44; Lenser, supra note 119 at para 28; Wolfe, supra 
note 119 at para 44; Frohlich, supra note 78 at para 75; Victoria-Penuela, supra note 119 at 
para 119; Russo, supra note 72 at para 75; MacLean, supra note 72 at para 12; Seaton, supra 
note 72 at para 88.
121. In 16 cases the court concluded only that the complainant was not subjectively afraid. See 
Carter, supra note 119 at para 9 (the court suggested that the trial judge erred in failing 
to assess the credibility of the complainant’s evidence regarding her fear); Gibb, supra note 
105 at para 64; Vanin, supra note 119 at paras 62-63; Lincoln, supra note 119 at para 25; 
Lukaniuk, supra note 119 at para 17; Hassan, supra note 105 at para 31; Gilmar, supra note 
78 at para 44; JW, supra note 78 at para 30; Moyse, supra note 78 at para 91; Monahan, supra 
note 110 at para 77; Greenberg, supra note 104 at para 101; Barkho, supra note 119 at para 
48; Blohm, supra note 85 at para 44; Chancellor, supra note 73 at para 69; Ross, supra note 78 
at paras, 32, 39; Wease, supra note 113 at para 23 (the court questioned the complainant’s 
fear as she did not seek a no contact order). In 9 cases any fear was found to be unreasonable: 
PJJE, supra note 72 at paras 38, 41; MDP, supra note 114 at para 34; Benoit, supra note 78 
at para 11; Bachmaier, supra note 85 at para 60; Nkony, supra note 120 at para 73; Benedict, 
supra note 120 at para 25; Benjamin, supra note 78 at para 44; MacLean, supra note 72 at 
para 12; Seaton, supra note 72 at para 89. In 6 cases, the complainant was found not to have 
any fear, but if she did, it was unreasonable. See TV, supra note 120 at para 144; Wolfe, supra 
note 119 at para 44; Frohlich, supra note 78 at paras 72, 75; Victoria-Penuela, supra note 119 
at paras 118, 119; Russo, supra note 72 at para 75; Lenser, supra note 119 at para 28.
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I. THE SUBJECTIVE COMPONENT: SHE WASN’T AFRAID
The complainant’s behaviour is a significant factor in the judicial analysis of 
whether she felt sufficiently fearful. In several cases, the judge’s conclusion that 
the complainant was not subjectively afraid was based, at least in part, on finding 
that her conduct was inconsistent with what was expected of a fearful woman. For 
example, in R v Monahan, the complainant testified that she was fearful because 
the accused was following her.122 She testified that she sometimes drove by the 
accused’s house to look for his vehicle so that she would not have to check for 
his vehicle hiding somewhere on her way home. She indicated that she did this 
on the suggestion of the police.123 The judge disbelieved her testimony about her 
fear, finding that “[i]f she had truly feared for her safety it is difficult to imagine 
why she would follow [the accused] from time to time as she did. These actions 
are not consistent with someone experiencing fear.”124 Here the judge assumed 
that there is one standard response to fear, and that departures from that standard 
are fatal to successful prosecution. This view ignores the sense of loss of control 
that women who are repeatedly harassed often experience. Knowing where his 
car was could help re-establish some sense of control over a situation that felt 
uncontrollable–what Stark refers to as “control in the context of no control.”125
In R v JW, the court employed similar reasoning to find that the complainant 
did not subjectively fear the accused.126 The complainant, only about 13 years old 
at the time of the offence, was the accused’s ex-girlfriend. The accused, who was 
16, could not accept the end of the relationship. She alleged that he threatened 
to kill her new boyfriend, continued to follow her home from school, continued 
to call her house, and attempted to put his hands down her pants. The accused 
was convicted of assault and uttering death threats but acquitted of criminal 
harassment. Justice Kenkel accepted that the accused repeatedly contacted the 
complainant and that, on one occasion, he refused to leave her home when 
asked.127 However, much was made of the fact that the complainant met with 
the accused twice during the period when he continued to pursue her. This fact 
gave the judge a reasonable doubt about her fear.128 The judge described the 
teenaged complainant as follows: “While she plainly found the accused annoying 
122. Monahan, supra note 110 at para 1.
123. Ibid at para 24.
124. Ibid at para 77.
125. Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 19 at 17.
126. JW, supra note 78.
127. Ibid at paras 6, 8, 28.
128. Ibid at para 30.
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at times and was fearful as a result of some of his statements, she continued to 
seek him out, perhaps enjoying the intense attention even if it was the wrong 
kind of attention.”129 Reminiscent of the persistent mythology in sexual assault 
that women invite and secretly desire sexual violence,130 the judge accepted that 
she was fearful, but then negated that fear because of her behaviour. It is simply 
not possible to demonstrate how a 13-year-old girl ‘should’ demonstrate fear 
as a result of harassment, death threats to her new boyfriend, and other related 
behaviour from the accused.
In R v Moyse,131 the judge found that the complainant was not afraid in 
part because she continued contact with the accused. The accused had contacted 
her on the pretence of getting his property back. The judge reasoned that the 
complainant could have returned the property if she was fearful of him as a way 
to reduce legitimate contact.132 The judge suggested that “[t]his is inconsistent 
and unexplained behaviour of someone who is fearful.”133 He also stated that 
if there had been genuine fear for her safety, she would have “organize[d] her 
life” to ensure no contact with the accused.134 The ongoing contact problem is 
a common theme in these cases. While many women do organize their lives 
around avoiding their harassers, this should not be a de facto element of the 
offence. Judges seemingly do not understand why a woman would have contact 
with someone she feared. There is no recognition that she might think she could 
resolve the situation by talking to the accused, that fear can coexist with other 
129. Ibid. See also Gilmar, supra note 78 at paras 42-44. In that case, no fear was found 
because the complainant continued to have contact with the accused. See also Russo, supra 
note 72 at para 75.
130. See e.g. Randall, “Ideal Victims,” supra note 49 at 420.
131. Moyse, supra note 78.
132. Ibid at para 91. The complainant’s reaction was also found wanting in MacLean. See supra 
note 72 at paras 5, 9. In that case, the accused repeatedly called his ex-wife, allegedly for the 
purpose of speaking to his sons, but often leaving hateful messages on her voicemail. The 
complainant testified that she was afraid for her safety, believing that “the defendant was 
unstable and that something would happen.” She spent the night at a friend’s home out of 
fear after she went to the police. The judge rejected her testimony as to her fear because “her 
sworn statement to vary the custody order, made only days before she went to the police, 
[did] not expressly assert this” and because the judge disagreed with her that one of the calls 
that she found disturbing contained a sexual innuendo. Although the judge was satisfied that 
the complainant was “psychologically disturbed” and “emotionally” distressed, the judge was 
not convinced that she feared for her physical safety.
133. Moyse, supra note 78 at para 55.
134. Ibid at para 86. Even though contact was likely given the nature of their jobs, the 
complainant was a Crown counsel and the accused was a police officer.
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feelings towards the accused, or that fear of a former intimate partner may 
manifest itself differently than fear of a stranger.
Sometimes trial judges rely on an absence of violence to reject the notion 
that the complainant was subjectively afraid for her safety, even though courts 
have repeatedly acknowledged that fear for one’s psychological safety is sufficient 
under section 264. In R v Russo, the accused had sexually groomed and sexually 
exploited the complainant beginning when she was about 14 years old and he 
was 59 years old.135 The complainant had a history of sexual abuse by a number of 
men and was living in poverty when she met the accused. The accused stayed in 
her life even after she married and had children. She eventually brought charges 
of criminal harassment when he refused to leave her family alone. The trial judge 
acquitted the accused of criminal harassment and a number of other charges, 
unconvinced that the complainant had feared for her safety. Although she had 
testified that she was afraid, the judge found that the accused had never behaved 
violently towards the complainant or her family. The judge used this conclusion, 
as well as the fact that the complainant felt some sympathy towards the accused, 
to reject the complainant’s evidence that she was afraid of him.136
A complainant’s failure to seek a no contact order is also considered in 
deciding whether she was truly afraid. In R v Wease, a complainant’s fear was 
doubted because she did not seek a no contact order against her husband, even 
though she did go to police to complain about his behaviour.137 The accused 
and the complainant were involved in divorce proceedings. He was convicted 
of criminal harassment at trial after following her and taking pictures of her 
vehicle. The conviction was overturned on summary appeal, with the court 
stating that, “There is no explanation given as to why, if the complainant was 
fearful and concerned as to her own emotional or physical well-being, she did 
not pursue a restraining order in the Family Court proceedings.”138 In R v Ross, 
the accused was acquitted of criminal harassment because the trial judge found 
that the complainant’s fear was equivocal.139 This conclusion was based, in part, 
on the fact that it took her a significant period of time before she sought a no 
135. Russo, supra note 72 at para 3.
136. Ibid at para 75. The court also found that any fear would be unreasonable. See also 
Chancellor, supra note 73 at paras 64-69. In that case, the complainants were the accused’s 
ex-wife and her fiancé. The judge concluded that there had been no overt threats of physical 
violence and that the fiancé’s conduct was inconsistent with his alleged fear of the accused; 
for example, the complainants did not immediately go to the police.
137. Wease, supra note 113 at para 22.
138. Ibid at para 23.
139. Ross, supra note 78 at para 39.
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contact order: roughly 2 weeks after the accused had assaulted her. The onus was 
clearly placed on the complainant in these cases to take the initiative to stop the 
harassment. The underlying (false) assumption is that no contact orders put an 
end to the accused’s harassing behaviour.
As one might expect, where the complainant does take steps to act like the 
responsible victim, courts are more likely to find she was afraid. For example, in 
R v Fader,140 the court explicitly acknowledged that the complainant took steps 
to secure her safety and communicate to the accused that the relationship was 
over.141 In R v Malakpour,142 the fact that the complainant avoided going out, 
avoided making friends, and purchased a condominium because of its increased 
security all contributed to the finding of subjective fear.
In a number of cases, the judge stated that the complainant was afraid, but 
that the fear did not necessarily relate to her psychological or physical safety. In 
other words, she had the wrong type of fear. For example, in R v Gibb,143 during 
the divorce proceedings of the accused and the complainant, the accused was 
repeatedly holding demonstrations with others about the state of family law in a 
park adjacent to the home of the complainant. On several occasions, anywhere 
from 6–10 protesters were dressed as judges, carrying signs, and protesting. One 
of them carried a sign saying “judges kill families.”144 The accused also carried a 
sign with the names of his children on it and his assertion that he loved them. 
The complainant changed her route to and from home and avoided going to 
the park for walks or bike rides. Although the judge found that there was some 
evidence as to the complainant’s fear, including her use of the words “scary” and 
“nervous,” her installation of an alarm system in her home, and her being upset 
and crying when the police attended at her home, the judge concluded that she 
“never articulated expressly that she was in fear for her safety or the safety of 
her children.”145
140. R v Fader, 2009 BCPC 61, [2009] BCWLD 4791.
141. Ibid at paras 8, 25.
142. R v Malakpour, 2007 BCPC 431 at paras 5-6, 18, [2008] BCWLD 2112, rev’d on other 
grounds 2008 BCCA 326, 258 BCAC 154 [Malakpour].
143. Gibb, supra note 105.
144. Ibid at para 13. Susan Boyd has documented how the fathers’ rights movement has 
downplayed the significance of intimate partner violence in its rhetoric about custody 
disputes. See Susan B Boyd, “Demonizing Mothers: Fathers’ Rights Discourses in Child 
Custody Law Reform Processes” (2004) 6:1 J Assoc for Research on Mothering 52 at 61.
145. Gibb, supra note 105 at para 61.
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In a particularly problematic decision, R v Lincoln, the accused left five 
insulting and threatening phone messages for his ex-girlfriend.146 He threatened 
to go to her workplace and contact her family members because she had not 
returned a ring he had given her. His final message to her stated:
I’m going to show you what kind of person I can be. You messed around with the 
wrong person… . You have no idea what I am capable of doing. And you are going 
to start seeing slowly but surely I am going to affect you in every single way there is 
in life. You can run away but I can find you. You can move to Jerusalem but I can 
still find you. That’s what I do as a living. And I will find you. So, I will give you 
the best advice. Give [sic] my ring. That’s the only advice I have for you. And very 
shortly I will be finding your Mom, where they live. And nobody can stop me. Have 
a good day. Rest in peace.147
The complainant testified that “rest in peace” in her mind referred to death.148 
Despite these not-so-subtle threats of serious harm, the trial judge concluded 
that the complainant was not subjectively fearful. The judge held that if the 
complainant had feared, her fear would have been reasonable, and found that 
the complainant “felt threatened by the messages” and that they “made her feel 
sick.”149 However, the judge concluded that she had not explicitly said that the 
“threat was to her safety, as opposed to her financial well-being” and therefore 
dismissed the charges.150 It is not clear how this last threat quoted above could 
be interpreted as a financial threat, particularly with the ominous “rest in peace” 
closing the message.
II. THE OBJECTIVE COMPONENT: HER FEAR WASN’T REASONABLE
As outlined earlier, even where the accused repeatedly harassed the complainant, 
causing her fear, and knew that he was harassing her, the accused will still be 
acquitted if the judge decides her fear was not reasonable. In the present sample, 
more acquittals resulted from the judge finding that the complainant did not fear 
for her safety than from findings that her fear was not reasonable. The reasonable-
ness requirement receives less scrutiny in the cases than was expected. However, 
there is significant overlap between the assessment of whether the complainant 
146. Lincoln, supra note 119 at para 14.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid at paras 24-25.
149. Ibid at para 25.
150. Ibid. See also Lukaniuk, supra note 119 at paras 6, 22. There, the court concluded that her 
fear was financial because the accused had threatened to disrupt her job as a Homestay host.
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was afraid (which will be influenced by whether fear would be reasonable in the 
circumstances) and whether that fear is assessed as reasonable.
For example, in R v PJJE, after the divorce of the accused and the complainant, 
the accused entered the formerly shared home to recover some property to which 
he felt he was entitled.151 At the time, the complainant had exclusive possession 
of the house pursuant to a court order. As a result of his unauthorized entry, the 
accused was placed under a section 810 peace bond that forbade any contact with 
the complainant, except through a third party for the purpose of arranging access 
to the children. He continued to contact the complainant, having numerous 
letters delivered to her house or taped on her door. In other incidents, he followed 
her or showed up at places she was attending so that he could see the children. 
The trial judge characterized the accused’s repeated harassment as merely the 
“zealous pursuit of what is perceived to be his parental rights,” and found that 
his conduct could “fairly be classified as threatening only in the sense of someone 
threatening to enforce a legal right.”152 The trial judge characterized the accused’s 
conduct as merely the accused’s attempt to “check up on the complainant from 
time to time,”153 despite the fact that he was under a court order not to contact 
her. The accused had never threatened violence although there were allegations 
of violence before the marriage broke down.154 The judge wrote, “His ‘threats’ 
[were] of prospective outcomes in court rather than physical harm.”155 Justice 
Skilnick accepted that the complainant felt harassed and afraid, and that the 
accused knew or ought to have known that his constant communication was 
harassment or at least that he was wilfully blind about whether the complainant 
was harassed.156 However, the judge was left in doubt as to whether her fear for 
her safety or that of her children was reasonable, commenting:
In saying this, I do not minimize the feelings of frustration that the Complainant has 
as a result of the bitterness and bad feelings from her matrimonial court battles with 
the Accused. The difficulty I have in finding criminal liability in these circumstances 
stems from the fact that all of the harassing behaviour is rooted in the matrimonial 
issues. The “threats” are of legal consequences, not of expressed or implied threats 
of violence or other affronts to the safety of the Complainant or of her children.157
151. PJJE, supra note 72 at para 10.
152. Ibid at paras 32-33.
153. Ibid at para 32.
154. Ibid at para 34.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid at paras 36-37.
157. Ibid at para 38.
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Justice Skilnick noted that while some matrimonial disputes may escalate 
into criminal harassment, “[t]he conduct of the Accused in this case leaves me in 
doubt as to whether that stage has been reached,” given that he never threatened 
the complainant, even in a veiled manner. Her fear was unreasonable because it 
was based on past, not future violence:
His behaviour may have generated fear in the Complainant. However that fear seems 
to be based on a concern that past behaviour might repeat itself. The communications 
in and of themselves can not [sic] reasonably be construed as threatening of anything 
other than legal action. I can not [sic] find beyond a reasonable doubt that his 
conduct is such as to reasonably cause the complainant to fear for her safety.158
The trial judge was dismissive of the complainant’s fear, indicating that 
while the accused was not “a living example of the prayer of St. Francis,” her fear 
was unreasonable.159
In R v Benedict, the accused had courted the complainant in anticipation 
of an arranged marriage according to their culture.160 She exercised her right 
to refuse the marriage according to custom and told him she did not want to 
see him anymore, but she agreed to meet him on one further occasion after 
breaking off the relationship. He frequently phoned her and waited in his car 
outside her workplace. The accused was cautioned more than once by the police 
and was subject to a no contact order with respect to the complainant. He had 
also apparently spent time in custody for prior harassing conduct against the 
complainant, although it appears that no charges were ever proceeded with at the 
time.161 The trial judge accepted all of the complainant’s evidence as credible and 
rejected the evidence of the accused as incredible and unreliable.162 Nonetheless 
he concluded, without any real explanation, that the complainant’s fear was 
not reasonable:
158. Ibid at para 41. See also Benoit, supra note 78 at para 11. In Benoit, the complainant’s fear 
was not reasonable because she did not cut off contact with the accused (via email) nor did 
she instruct him to contact her only through counsel. This was another case in which access 
to children was an issue.
159. PJJE, supra note 72 at para 44. The judge wrote: “[T]he conduct of the Accused may be 
described as a zealous pursuit of what he perceived to be his parental rights” (ibid at para 
32). Scholars have documented how men can manipulate their zealous pursuit of parental 
rights to continue access and control over the women involved, particularly in the context of 
violent relationships. See Beeble, Bybee & Sullivan, supra note 40.
160. Benedict, supra note 120 at para 4.
161. It is unclear from the judgment how long he spent in custody and what the basis of the 
previous harassing conduct was.
162. Benedict, supra note 120 at para 18.
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I accept that [the complainant] was made nervous and upset by Mr. Benedict’s 
appearance outside her home. Her privacy and sense of peace had been disturbed 
once again by the accused’s pitiable conduct. However, given the chronology and 
context of events since May 2001, while I consider it probable and while I accept 
that the experience for her was quite unsettling, I am not satisfied on all the evidence 
to the requisite standard that the complainant feared for her safety on an objective 
standard of reasonableness. In this regard, the prosecution has failed to prove one of 
the essential elements of criminal harassment.163
Yet the judge clearly had some concern for the safety of the complainant 
given that he ordered the accused not to have any contact or communication 
with the complainant or any member of her family.
 In three of the four cases where acquittals were based entirely on the grounds 
of unreasonableness (i.e., where subjective fear was not doubted), the accused 
was subject to a no contact order to stay away from the complainant.164 This 
finding is difficult to explain because one would expect that the presence of a 
no contact order would give judges more support for the complainant’s fear and 
the reasonableness thereof. The complainant presumably obtained a no contact 
order for a reason, and the fact that an accused is willing to ignore a court order 
demonstrates his willingness to step outside the bounds of the law to engage in 
harassment. One would expect that the complainant’s resultant fear would be 
considered reasonable. In the overall sample, the presence of a no contact order 
made conviction more likely, as one would expect (see Appendix). It is possible 
that police are more likely to lay charges of criminal harassment sooner where 
there is a no contact order, and thus, the behaviour may not have escalated as far 
(although the ongoing harassment in Benedict in particular was quite significant). 
Yet, the high conviction rate in cases where no contact orders are in place belies 
this possibility.165 These three cases represent such a small number that no real 
163. Ibid at para 25.
164. PJJE, supra note 72 (accused was subject to a no contact order); Benoit, supra note 78; 
Benedict, supra note 120.
165. See MDP, supra note 114. In that case, the accused and his wife had separated after a 
relationship of several years and were involved in a custody dispute over their child. The 
complainant had secured a no contact order against the accused that only permitted him 
to contact the child via telephone. In the past, the accused had received a conditional 
discharge for making harassing telephone calls, after he made 100-150 telephone calls to 
his wife in two hours. The criminal harassment charges resulted from the accused’s alleged 
suspicion (based on noises he heard over the phone) that his wife was abusing their child. 
He repeatedly telephoned the police, resulting in police attendance at his wife’s home on 
four occasions within 16 days. With respect to the criminal harassment charge, Warren J 
found that the accused’s phone calls resulted from his genuine belief that his child was at 
risk. Further, Warren J found that it was not objectively reasonable that the wife was ever 
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conclusions can be drawn from the fact that fear was found to be unreasonable in 
the face of a no contact order. However, the fact that women’s fear is considered 
unreasonable when the harassment takes place in the context of a no contact 
order creates a bind for women: if she does not get a no contact order, she was not 
sufficiently afraid; yet, if she does, her fear may still be labelled as unreasonable. 
Why should women seek no contact orders if their violation does not render the 
fear they experience reasonable?
A finding that a woman’s fear is unreasonable, where the other elements of 
the offence are established, is highly problematic in light of the evidence that 
women are particularly attuned to the cues of abusive intimate male partners. 
This has been widely recognized in the context of intimate partner violence,166 
and there is no reason to suspect otherwise in the context of criminal harassment. 
It is very likely that the complainant is in a better position than judges and 
juries to assess whether to take seriously the harassing activities of her former 
intimate partner.
As with the cases on subjective fear, the complainant who has taken steps 
to avoid the harassment is more likely to have her fear labelled as reasonable.167 
In R v Lauzon,168 for example, in deciding whether the complainant’s fear was 
reasonable, the judge noted that she had changed her phone number to avoid 
the accused, limited the places she went to in town to avoid him, and knew he 
would be waiting for her when she left work. The court concluded, “It seems to 
me clearly in that context it was reasonable for her to feel as she did that she was 
fearful of Mr. Lauzon.”169
As mentioned, there is a significant overlap between a finding that a woman 
was not afraid and that her fear was unreasonable. Both findings are premised 
on assumptions driven by how we expect women to express and respond to fear. 
in fear for her safety as a result of the telephone calls. The complainant had testified (ibid 
at para 30): “I was worried just taking my garbage out. I felt uncomfortable getting in and 
out of my car. I would always be, you know, double-checking my shoulders during grocery 
shopping. It was not–it was like walking on eggshells all of the time.” Warren J found that 
the phone messages that the accused left were not angry and threatening, but instead were 
tearful, pleading, and rambling (ibid at para 32). Although Warren J accepted that “it may 
be that she subjectively feared for her safety,” there was no objectively threatening language 
(ibid at para 34).
166. R v Lavallee, [1990] 1 SCR 852 at 880-881, 55 CCC (3d) 97; Julie Blackman, “Potential 
Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of Battered Women Who Kill” 
(1986), 9:3&4 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 227. See also Sheehy, supra note 112 at 52.
167. See e.g. Malakpour, supra note 142 at paras 5-6, 18.
168. R v Lauzon, 2009 ONCJ 666, 86 WCB (2d) 791, aff’d 2010 ONSC 3592, 89 WCB (2d) 91.
169. Ibid at para 37.
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The former finding implies that a woman was not believed in her assertions of 
fear, usually because she failed to take adequate steps to avoid the harassment or 
because her fear was not manifest in the manner we expect women to demonstrate 
fear. Finding that her fear was not reasonable implies that, while we may believe 
she was afraid, that fear was exaggerated or illegitimate (or even hysterical). It 
is important not to overstate the differences between an acquittal based on no 
fear and an acquittal based on unreasonable fear. In the actual cases, the reason-
ableness requirement often plays a role in the subjective determination of fear. 
In other words, courts may disbelieve her actual fear precisely because it is not 
consistent with expectations of how a reasonable woman would behave in the 
circumstances. For example, if the complainant fails to make clear that she wants 
the harassment to stop, this failure may be “taken to be acting inconsistently with 
her assertion of fear” or taken as “condoning his continued attentions,” which 
can in turn be taken to “remove the objective basis for fear.”170 In other words, 
both subjective fear and its reasonableness can be negated by evidence that the 
complainant failed to behave like the “responsible victim.”
I am not suggesting that none of the acquittals in the above decisions were 
justified. Nor am I suggesting that women should not take steps to avoid criminal 
harassment by former intimate partners, as most choose to do. Rather, I would 
argue that taking such steps should not be a necessary prerequisite to criminal 
prosecution of harassers. Clearly, fear is not the only response to harassment, yet it 
is the only response that section 264 acknowledges as legitimate. Judging women 
for continuing to have contact with their harassers fails to acknowledge the 
complex emotions that can result from being victimized by one’s former intimate 
partner. Requiring the complainant to radically change her life or to take steps 
to make sure the harassment is minimized shifts the focus onto her behaviour 
and away from the behaviour of the accused in a way that is reminiscent of 
the sexual assault context.171 Such responsibilization also shifts attention away 
from the failure of the legal system to enforce no contact orders, and away from 
the state’s obligation to protect women from harassing behaviour. The problem 
lies both in the legislation, which requires reasonable fear, and in the judicial 
interpretation thereof.
170. Mustaka, supra note 116 at para 47.
171. See e.g. Benedet, “Intoxicated Women,” supra note 49.
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2. MENS REA: DID THE ACCUSED KNOW THAT HIS CONDUCT WAS 
HARASSING?
The fault requirement for criminal harassment has been described as “one of the 
most controversial elements of the crime” and has been dealt with differently in 
different jurisdictions.172 The mens rea for criminal harassment in section 264 
is whether the accused knew or was reckless with respect to the fact that the 
complainant was harassed. This requirement has been criticized for allowing the 
man who sees harassment as “romantic pursuit” of the complainant to avoid 
conviction.173 Similarly, the man who calls or texts his former partner 200 
times under the guise of resolving access to children will be acquitted if he does 
not consider whether that behaviour is harassing.174 In some cases, the mens 
rea requirement has been interpreted as a positive responsibility on women to 
communicate to the potential accused that she is afraid or harassed.
The latter interpretation can be analogized to the early interpretation of 
non-consent in the sexual assault context. Early case law put the responsibility 
on women to communicate a “no” on the issue of consent. Only more recently 
have the courts come to an understanding of affirmative consent that requires 
a communication of consent (not of non-consent).175 In criminal harassment, 
the wording of section 264 and its judicial interpretation creates an ongoing 
requirement that a woman communicate to the accused that she is being harassed. 
In other words, a man’s harassing pursuit of a woman, causing her to fear, is 
acceptable unless she communicates otherwise to him. Sometimes contacting the 
police or seeking a no contact order will be sufficient to demonstrate that one 
is harassed,176 but as the data in the sample demonstrate, the existence of a no 
contact order does not make conviction inevitable. The sample did not contain 
many intimate partner cases where the male accused was acquitted because he 
172. Troy E McEwan, Paul E Mullen & Rachel McKenzie, “Anti-Stalking Legislation and 
Practice: Are We Meeting Community Needs?” (2007) 14:2 Psych, Psychol & L 207 at 209.
173. One study found that 58% of stalkers were motivated by their unwillingness to accept that 
the relationship was over. See Doris Hall, Outside Looking In: Stalkers and their Victims (PhD 
dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1997) [unpublished], cited in Goldsworthy & Raj, 
supra note 19 at 179.
174. Three leading psychologists studying “stalking” suggest that many perpetrators will not have 
the high level of subjective fault that is demanded by some legislation such as Canada’s: “The 
upshot of this lack of intent is that offenders who have caused great damage to their victims 
over extended periods of time have been found not guilty and released.” McEwan, Mullen & 
McKenzie, supra note 172 at 209.
175. Ewanchuk, supra note 50.
176. R v PMB, 2011 BCPC 370 at paras 42-45, [2011] BCJ No 2499 (QL).
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lacked the mens rea for criminal harassment. This is in part because mens rea is 
usually the last element considered: the trial judge does not even consider mens 
rea if there is a reasonable doubt about the complainant’s lack of fear or its reason-
ableness, both of which are part of the actus reus.
There is also an overlap between mens rea and reasonable fear such that 
a finding of mens rea is less likely where the judge has concluded there is no 
reasonable fear. The steps the complainant takes to avoid the accused, and what 
she communicates to him, will be critical for both elements. The following 
excerpt from R v Mustaka demonstrates the overlap between the elements of 
criminal harassment:
These cases appear to often boil down to a question of degree. In Ryback, above, 
Finch J.A. looked to whether the complainant had made her rejection of the accused 
known to him, such that he must have been taken to be reckless as to the effect of 
his attention on her. It seems the issue of communication may be relevant to both mens 
rea and the reasonableness of the complainant’s assertion of fear. Arguably, some level of 
persistent behaviour may occur in a dating context or in the course of a relationship 
breakup and not be either objectively frightening or indicative of recklessness. 
However, one would also expect that there is an onus on the accused to ensure 
that a complainant welcomes his attentions, rather than adopting a course of wilful 
blindness where there is no active encouragement. See: R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 
S.C.R. 330.
[A] complainant who fails to rebuff unwanted entreaties may in some circumstances 
be taken to be acting inconsistently with her assertion of fear. That is essentially the 
argument here, that the complainant had not made it plain enough to Mr. Mustaka 
that the relationship was over, essentially that she was allowing or condoning his 
continued attentions, which can either be taken to remove the objective basis for 
fear on the part of the complainant or, presumably, to negate recklessness on the 
part of the accused.177
As we have seen so often with sexual assault, the complainant must demonstrate 
that the accused’s harassing behaviour was unwanted. The judge went on to hold 
that, when dealing with former intimate partners, there is a higher onus on the 
Crown to establish that the accused’s behaviour in pursuing a reconciliation 
crossed the line into criminal conduct unless the accused’s conduct is “inherently 
177. Mustaka, supra note 116 at paras 46-47 [emphasis added].
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offensive or obviously uninvited.”178 In other words, after being in an intimate 
relationship, you are expected to tolerate a certain amount of harassment. This is 
particularly problematic for women leaving abusive relationships.
In the six cases where the accused was acquitted on this basis,179 the rationale 
was often that the complainant had failed in her efforts to inform the accused that 
his behaviour was harassing; the accused was not expected to figure this out for 
himself. In R v Benjamin,180 the accused was convicted at trial, but the conviction 
was overturned on summary conviction appeal. The judgment is a bit unclear as 
to which element of the offence led to the acquittal. However, the court made a 
number of relevant statements regarding mens rea and regarding the complain-
ant’s failure to communicate that she was harassed. For example, the court stated: 
“In her telephone conversation, Ms. D did not say that he frightened her or that 
he intimidated her or that she was threatened by him. She did not warn him that 
there would be consequences should they encounter each other again.”181 The fact 
that the complainant had initiated a phone call with the accused, even though 
the purpose of the call was to make clear that she did not want to see him again, 
was held against her even though the accused knew that the complainant wanted 
nothing to do with him:
That Mr. Benjamin was obsessed and knew that Ms. D did not want to have anything 
to do with him does not mean that he knew that she was afraid or intimidated by 
his presence. It does not mean his conduct was designed to invoke the fear of an 
invasion of Ms. D’s privacy. She never told him that he frightened her in their three-
hour telephone phone call, which was their last direct contact before May 27, 2008. 
Her conduct in that telephone call, which she initiated, if anything, revealed her 
strength and her resolve not to be overborne by his desire to reconcile.182
178. Ibid at para 48. This additional burden in the context of intimate partners is reminiscent 
of all the challenges around prosecuting spousal sexual assaults. See e.g. the work 
done on marital rape. Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault and Spousal Relationships, 
‘Continuous Consent’ and the Law: Honest but Mistaken Judicial Beliefs” (2008) 32:1 
U Man LJ [Randall, “Sexual Assault and Spousal Relationships”]; Jennifer Koshan, “The 
Legal Treatment of Marital Rape and Women’s Equality: An Analysis of the Canadian 
Experience” The Equality Effect (September 2010), online: <www.theequalityeffect.org/pdfs/
maritalrapecanadexperience.pdf> [Koshan, “The Legal Treatment of Marital Rape”].
179. Benjamin, supra note 78 at para 30; Wease, supra note 113 at para 22; Ross, supra note 78 
at para 32; Frohlich, supra note 78 at paras 52-56; Seaton, supra note 72 at para 87; R v 
Menkarios, 2010 ONSC 5478, 90 WCB (2d) 524 [Menkarios]. In Menkarios, the acquittal 
was quashed on appeal and a new trial ordered but I have been unable to find any record of 
whether the accused was retried.
180. Benjamin, supra note 78.
181. Ibid at para 30.
182. Ibid at para 45.
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In R v Wease, the accused was initially convicted of criminal harassment on 
the basis of wilful blindness.183 The accused admitted he did not care what impact 
his actions had on the complainant, and the trial judge found this was adequate 
to constitute wilful blindness. On appeal, however, the judicial focus was on the 
fact that the complainant had not sought a no contact order against the accused 
nor communicated the fact that she was afraid:
I cannot agree that the accused engaged in such conduct that he knew harassed the 
complainant nor was he reckless or wilfully blind as to whether the complainant 
was harassed. In this case, the appellant received no warning that his conduct was 
considered harassment by the complainant; nor was this communicated to the 
appellant through the complainant’s lawyer or through the police. There was no 
outstanding restraining order … There is no explanation given as to why, if the 
complainant was fearful and concerned as to her own emotional or physical well-
being, she did not pursue a restraining order in the Family Court proceedings.184
Similarly, in R v Ross, a summary conviction appeal was allowed on the basis 
that the accused did not have the requisite mens rea.185 The accused suffered from 
mental health issues following an accident. He had become aggressive and was 
behaving unpredictably towards his wife. Although the complainant considered 
herself to be separated from the accused, the appellate court found that she 
might not have effectively communicated the separation to him. The court 
made this finding even though they were living in separate homes and she had 
started discussing divorce with him. She testified that she did not tell him that 
his behaviour was harassing because she was afraid it would escalate his conduct. 
The trial judge clearly found that the accused knew his behaviour was harassing, 
given that the accused made repeated angry telephone calls to the complainant 
and made regular disruptive visits to the complainant’s home and workplace. The 
summary conviction appeal court disagreed, finding that she should have told 
him that she was afraid and that he should stop communicating with her. The 
court also noted that there was never any police intervention telling the accused 
to stay away from the complainant, even though the complainant had in fact 
called the police. The court indicated that she had never followed up with an 
application for a no contact order nor was it clear that the police had actually 
spoken with the accused and warned him not to contact the complainant.186
183. Wease, supra note 113 at para 8.
184. Ibid at paras 21-23.
185. Ross, supra note 78 at para 38.
186. Ibid at para 33.
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There may be a number of reasons why a woman would not want to 
communicate her fear to her former intimate partner. For example, a communi-
cation of fear could make the complainant feel more vulnerable to the accused 
and could encourage the accused to persist in his behaviour. In essence, a 
communication of fear could demonstrate that the accused has been successful in 
his attempts to harass the complainant, thus giving the accused even more power 
over her. The complainant may feel she needs to retain some sense of control of 
the situation and not to reveal to the accused just how fearful she is.187
The mens rea cases also demonstrate concerns similar to those of the 
subjective fear cases—if the complainant initiates contact, for example, it is more 
likely that the accused will be found not to have the mens rea. Paradoxically, the 
complainant is expected to communicate the fact that she is harassed and yet 
not to communicate with the accused. In R v Frohlich, the court found that the 
complainant was “equivocal” because she had contacted the accused twice during 
the relevant time period, even though one of those contacts was to insist that he 
have no further contact with her.188 Similarly, in R v Seaton, the court held that 
the complainant’s failure to inform the accused that she had a new boyfriend and 
to tell him to stop calling her suggested that he did not know he was harassing 
her by continuing to attempt to re-establish their relationship.189
In R v Menkarios,190 the accused was convicted at trial of assaulting his former 
girlfriend twice; however, he was acquitted of criminal harassment because the 
complainant apparently unconsciously invited the harassment. The summary 
conviction appeal court summed up the trial judge’s reasons for acquitting the 
accused of criminal harassment as follows:
The trial judge stated that he acquitted the accused on the harassment charge because 
he was left wondering “whether in some unconscious sort of way [the complainant] 
may not have inadvertently invited that or in an attitude of appeasement just to let 
it pass and there may have been a note of encouragement.”191
It is not entirely clear from the trial decision to what element of criminal 
harassment this “unconscious” invitation to be harassed relates, although the 
appellate judgment seems to suggest it relates to both the complainant’s fear and 
187. See Goldsworthy & Raj, supra note 19 at 187. The authors note that communicating distress 
to the harasser can be counterproductive because such behaviours tell him his harassment is 
having an effect.
188. Frohlich, supra note 78 at para 54.
189. Seaton, supra note 72 at para 87.
190. Menkarios, supra note 179.
191. Ibid at para 3.
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the accused’s intent. The appellate court noted that the trial judge’s observation 
was purely speculative and that nothing in the evidence supported this conclusion. 
The trial judge also indicated that the complainant had a tendency to look back 
at the history of their relationship and “to attribute great importance to minor 
hurts and peccadilloes,”192 a puzzling finding given that the relationship history 
included two assaults prior to the charge of harassment in question. There was 
strong evidence of ongoing harassment, and it was clear the accused had been 
warned by the police to stop contacting the complainant. This type of judicial 
pronouncement—that a woman unconsciously invited male violence against 
her—would no longer be considered acceptable in the sexual assault context and 
should not be acceptable in criminal harassment.
These mens rea cases demonstrate the problem with putting the responsi-
bility on the complainant to alert the accused to the fact that his behaviour is 
harassing. A subjective mens rea standard may be particularly inappropriate for 
criminal harassment given that some accused men in these cases seem able to 
detach themselves from the reality of their actions and to retain the belief that 
they are engaged in legitimate pursuit of their former partner or of access to 
children or property. Such an accused essentially gets a free pass with his harassing 
behaviour until the complainant has communicated her distress to him. As such, 
the mens rea component allows acquittal of the accused who believes he is entitled 
to ongoing access to the complainant or the accused who never bothers to think 
about how the complainant perceives his behaviour.
Canada is not unique in struggling to find an appropriate balance between 
the need to recognize the harm to women from criminal harassment and the need 
to avoid over-criminalization. Even though criminal harassment is a relatively 
new crime in most jurisdictions, several countries have already amended their 
new legislation in light of the types of frailties identified in this article. Part IV, 
below, presents a brief summary of how other jurisdictions have responded to the 
challenges in drafting criminal harassment legislation with a view to identifying 
options for reform in the Canadian context.
IV. LESSONS FROM ABROAD
The 1990s saw a flurry of legislative action in the area of criminal harassment. 
In many jurisdictions, as in Canada, the legislation was triggered by outrage over 
cases where women had been murdered after being criminally harassed, usually 
192. Ibid at para 66.
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by a former intimate partner.193 California passed the first anti-stalking law in the 
United States in 1990, and every other state followed suit.194 Every Australian 
jurisdiction enacted legislation between 1993 and 1996. In response to criticism 
concerning gaps in the initial legislation, several jurisdictions in Australia signifi-
cantly revised their legislation only a few years after enactment.195 New Zealand 
passed criminal harassment laws in 1997.196 Very few of these jurisdictions 
require both a high level of intention and a particular response on the part of the 
complainant (as in Canada); most focus on one element or the other.197
193. Grant, Bone & Grant, supra note 8; McEwan, Mullen & MacKenzie, supra note 172 at 208.
194. California Penal Code, § 646.9 (2015); Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 19 at 256.
195. Western Australia amended its anti-stalking legislation in 1998 in the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act (No 1) 1998 (WA), ss 4-5. See Karen Whitney, “Western Australia’s New 
Stalking Legislation: Will it Fill the Gap?” (1999) 28 UWA L Rev 293. Queensland 
significantly amended its anti-stalking law in 1999 in the Criminal Code (Stalking) 
Amendments Act 1999. See Sally Kift, “Stalking in Queensland: From the Nineties to Y2K” 
(1999) 11:1 Bond LR 144. The Northern Territory amended its anti-stalking provisions in 
2001. See Criminal Code Amendment Act (No 3) 2001 (NT). Victoria has also undertaken a 
number of amendments. See e.g. Crimes (Stalking) Act 2003 (Vic).
196. Harassment Act 1997 (NZ), 1997/92, s 8.
197. Out of all the Australian jurisdictions, only South Australia has both a strict requirement 
that the perpetrator cause “serious harm” or “serious apprehension or fear” and that the 
victim actually fear harm as in Canada. McEwan, Mullen & McKenzie, supra note 172 at 
210-11. Subjective intention to cause fear on the part of the perpetrator was an essential 
mens rea element of almost all of the initial Australian anti-stalking provisions. However, 
some Australian jurisdictions have since amended their legislation to incorporate a less 
stringent intent requirement with Western Australia and the Northern Territory adopting an 
objective standard of mens rea based on reasonableness. The amended Queensland provision 
simply requires that the accused intend to direct his conduct at the complainant. There is 
no requirement that he intend to cause her fear. The approach to the complainant’s response 
is only an objective test, with no subjective test of what the complainant was actually 
experiencing. The question is whether “reasonably in the circumstances,” a person would 
apprehend or fear violence to herself, others, or to property, or whether she would experience 
a “detriment.” Detriment is defined broadly and includes serious mental, psychological, or 
emotional harm and also includes an impact on the person’s day-to-day behaviours such 
as changing one’s route or form of transport to work or other places. See Criminal Code 
(Stalking) Amendment Act 1999 (Qld), s 3. Each jurisdiction in Australia has a different 
combination of elements with some focusing more on the intention of the perpetrator and 
others focusing on whether the behaviour in question could be reasonably expected to cause 
fear. Western Australia has fused these approaches by creating two stalking offences. “Stalking 
with intent to intimidate” requires a subjective intention in the perpetrator to intimidate 
the victim, but makes no mention of a required victim response. The second, less serious, 
summary offence requires that the perpetrator’s actions could be reasonably expected to 
intimidate and did in fact intimidate the victim, but no subjective intent on the part of the 
perpetrator is necessary. See Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA), s 338E.
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England has recently moved away from a rigid focus on fear of violence. 
In 1997, England enacted two provisions in the Protection from Harassment 
Act 1997.198 These provisions were reportedly enacted hastily without a lot of 
thought by a government wanting to appear to be responding to crime before 
an election.199 Section 2 of the Act is the equivalent of a summary conviction 
offence that involves harassment leading to alarm or distress. It is punishable by 
a maximum 6 months imprisonment. Section 4 creates a more serious offence 
where the conduct leads to a fear of violence on the part of the complainant. 
This offence is subject to a maximum punishment of 5 years. More recently, in 
2012, England enacted a new provision through amendments to the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997.200 The 2012 amendments were enacted in response to 
a government report demonstrating that existing laws against harassment were 
inadequate.201 Concerns were raised that many cases were too serious for the 
lesser offence but could not meet the threshold of fear of violence required by 
the more serious offence. The fear of violence provision set too high a threshold 
and failed to recognize the impact of harassment even where there is no explicit 
fear of violence.202 The new section 4A(1)(b)(ii) adds a third offence where the 
accused engages in a course of conduct that causes the victim “serious alarm or 
distress which has a substantial adverse effect on the victim’s usual day-to-day 
activities” and where the defendant knew, or ought to have known that his 
conduct would have this effect. This offence is punishable by a maximum 5 
years’ imprisonment.203
This latest English provision has several advantages over Canada’s section 264. 
First, it recognizes that harassment can have a profound negative impact on a 
person’s day-to-day life without necessarily causing them fear. Never knowing 
when the harasser is going to appear, incessant contact through social media, 
changing one’s day-to-day life to avoid contact with the accused, and the 
lack of control over one’s life that results from ongoing harassment could all 
be recognized under this provision. The Home Office guidelines on the new 
law suggest that indicators of substantial adverse effect on the usual day-to-day 
activities could include:
198. Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK), c 40, ss 2, 4.
199. See Judith Gowland, “Protection from Harassment Act 1997: the ‘New’ Stalking Offences” 
(2013) 77:5 J Crim L 387 at 387.
200. Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (UK), c 9, ss 111-12.
201. Justice Unions’ Parliamentary Group, supra note 33.
202. Gowland, supra note 199 at 393. See also R v Ireland; R v Burstow (1997), [1998] AC 147 
HL (Eng), [1998] 1 Cr App R 177 at 180-81 (where Steyn LJ raises this problem as well).
203. Protection from Harassment Act 1997, supra note 198, ss 4A(1)(b)(ii), 4A(5)(a).
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the victim changing her routes to work, work patterns, or employment;
the victim arranging for friends or family to pick up children from school (to avoid 
contact with the stalker);
the victim putting in place additional security measures in their home;
the victim moving home;
physical or mental ill health;
the victim’s deterioration in performance at work due to stress;
the victim stopping /or changing the way they socialise.204
Thus, the English approach does not define one reaction that alone is 
sufficient. The legislation acknowledges a broad range of possible reactions and 
does not purport to present an exhaustive list of the types of harms recognized. 
Under Canadian legislation, in contrast, a deteriorating work performance or a 
change in socialization patterns would not pass the threshold of reasonable fear.
Second, the complainant’s reaction is not subjected to a standard of reason-
ableness. There does have to be a substantial adverse effect on her daily activities, 
but this effect is assessed subjectively. The English structure prioritizes the 
complainant’s actual response rather than the response that is expected of her. 
While there is no requirement that the complainant’s response be reasonable in 
the English legislation, there is a defence for an accused whose course of conduct 
was reasonable for his own protection or the protection of property.205
Third, the accused does not have to intend to harass the complainant. It is 
sufficient if a reasonable person would know that his behaviour is harassing. The 
man who thinks he is merely pursuing his former partner to win her affections 
or the man who believes he is entitled to harass his former spouse in his “zealous 
pursuit” of access to his children would not have a defence as he does under the 
Canadian legislation. Whereas Canadian law judges the reasonableness of the 
complainant’s reaction, English law holds the harasser to a standard of reason-
ableness. While it remains to be seen how judges will interpret this provision, 
and specifically whether they will assess the adequacy of women’s responses, the 
English legislation is an example of a law reform effort that tries to address the 
wide range of harms caused by criminal harassment in a manner that is responsive 
to the impact of such behaviour on complainants.
204. Home Office Crime and Policing Group, A change to the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997: introduction of two new specific offences of stalking, Circular 018/2012 (np: Home 
Office, 16 October 2012).
205. Protection from Harassment Act 1997, supra note 198, s 4(3)(c).
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V. CONCLUSION
This study of the case law demonstrates that, too often, the Canadian law 
on criminal harassment puts the responsibility on women to avoid criminal 
harassment and to ensure that the accused knows that his behaviour is harassing, 
rather than putting the responsibility on the accused to assess his own behaviour 
and determine that repeated phone calls or texts, watching, following, sending 
pictures to the complainant’s workplace, and the like, are harassing behaviours.
Criminal harassment may emerge from a previously violent relationship, 
may escalate into physical violence, and in extreme cases, can lead to femicide.206 
However, it is important to recognize that the potential for physical violence is 
not the only harm of criminal harassment. The cumulative impact of a number of 
behaviours that might not warrant criminal liability if considered in isolation can 
have a devastating impact on a woman’s life. These behaviours leave complain-
ants with a sense of dread, loss of control, and trauma that builds over time 
and can have a significant impact on their mental and physical health. In the 
context of intimate partner violence, researchers have demonstrated that it is not 
necessarily the physical violence that causes the most harm to women but, rather, 
the psychological impact of the male partner’s other controlling behaviours.207 
Focusing on individual components of the harassment fails to acknowledge the 
totality of the ordeal experienced by the victim of criminal harassment.208
Canadian legislation accordingly needs to be rethought with a view to 
removing the obligation on women to establish that they have behaved like 
proper victims. Our experience with sexual assault teaches that there is no ideal 
victim, and no ‘correct’ response to criminal harassment. Requiring women to 
respond in a particular way perpetuates stereotypes about female victimization 
206. MacFarlane, supra note 10.
207. Evan Stark, “Commentary on Johnson’s ‘Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and 
Asymmetry in Domestic Violence’” (2006) 12:11 Violence against Women 1019 at 
1020. See also Sheehy, supra note 112 at 234. Sheehy demonstrates that the psychological 
abuse and fear involved in intimate partner violence can be more devastating than the 
physical violence.
208. Emily Finch, The Criminalisation of Stalking: Constructing the Problem and Evaluating 
the Solution (London, UK: Cavendish Publishing, 2001) at 172. See also Stark, Coercive 
Control, supra note 19 at 257 (describing “the cumulative effects when these acts occur as 
part of a single pattern and are directed at a single victim [which] completely misses the 
elements of subordination and entrapment, the most dramatic consequence when these acts 
are combined.”).
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by intimate partners.209 In this respect, the recent English legislation provides a 
useful example. Removing the focus on fear and the requirement that the fear 
be reasonable would be a significant start. While it is impossible to remove the 
impact on the complainant altogether from the definition of the offence (because, 
in some cases, the behaviours of the accused are not otherwise criminal), it is 
important that no one response be privileged over others. Women should not 
be told that there is only one appropriate response to criminal harassment and 
that all others will be disregarded. The English legislation is instructive in this 
regard; it requires a substantial adverse effect on the usual day-to-day activities 
of the complainant, thus acknowledging a range of responses to ongoing 
harassment. Canadian law could incorporate a similar requirement for some 
form of a substantial adverse effect on day-to-day activities. The complainant’s 
response to the harassment should not be subjected to a reasonableness inquiry, 
as women are in a better position to understand the cues of the harasser and the 
seriousness of the harassment. People respond to trauma and abuse in different 
ways, and the reasonableness requirement shifts the responsibility onto women 
to be “responsible victims.”
With respect to mens rea, an objective standard of liability, such as that 
adopted in the new English provision, would require the accused’s behaviour to 
be subjected to a standard of reasonableness. The accused who reasonably believed 
that his behaviour was not harassing would still be acquitted, but the accused who 
unreasonably believed he was romantically pursuing the complainant or asserting 
rights over property or children would no longer have a defence. In other words, 
we should shift the risk that the accused’s harassing behaviour is unwanted onto 
him, not the complainant. More importantly, if a standard of reasonableness 
were used to assess the accused’s mental state, judges could no longer impose the 
requirement that the complainant communicate her fear to the accused where a 
reasonable person would have known his behaviour was harassing. It should be 
sufficient if the harassing conduct takes place repeatedly, has a significant adverse 
effect on the complainant, and the accused knows or ought to know that fact.
These changes would make a significant contribution to ensuring that 
the criminal justice system recognizes the harm done to women by criminal 
harassment. Other jurisdictions, most notably England, have taken steps to 
amend their legislation to address the seriousness of criminal harassment. It is 
time for Canada to follow suit.
209. See e.g. the work done on marital rape. See generally Randall, “Sexual Assault & Spousal 
Relationships,” supra note 178; Koshan, “The Legal Treatment of Marital Rape,” 
supra note 178.
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APPENDIX: CONVICTION RATES WITH AND WITHOUT A NO CONTACT ORDER
Previous No Contact Order Present No Previous Order Present




Accused 53 (85.5%) 9 (14.5%) 62 81 (62.8%) 48 (37.2%) 129
Female 
Accused 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 4 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 4
Total 57 9 66 82 51 133
